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ARTICLES
PERMISSIVE BANKRUPTCY ABSTENTION*
SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB"
If a federal court has bankruptcy jurisdiction over proceedings1 that
instead could be heard in a state court, when should the federal court abstain

from exercising that jurisdiction? Bankruptcy jurisdiction is federal
jurisdiction. Therefore, one would expect that the standard governing

abstention

from

bankruptcy jurisdiction

would

closely

resemble

nonbankruptcy abstention doctrines. Nonetheless, federal courts abstain from

exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction 2 far more frequently than they abstain
* © Susan Block-Lieb.

Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law (blocklsu@shu.edu). I owe special
thanks to Leif Clark, Howie Erichson, Ed Hartnett, Larry King, Dick Lieb, John Nagle, Charlie
Sullivan and Mike Zimmer for their wisdom, patience and kindness in reviewing prior drafts of this
Article. I am also deeply grateful for the financial assistance provided by Dean Ronald Riccio and the
Seton Hall Summer Research Stipend.
1. In bankruptcy practice, proceedings are the litigated disputes that begin with the filing of
either a complaint or a motion. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001-7003, 9014 (defining "adversary
proceedings" and "contested matters"). The procedure followed in litigation of these bankruptcy
proceedings generally resembles the FederalRules of Civil Procedure.See FED. R. BANKR. P. 70017087 (adopting most Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to adversary proceedings) and 9014
(incorporating some but not all of FederalRules of Civil Procedureto contested matters). Numerous
proceedings may occur in the context of a bankruptcy "case." Distinct from a proceeding, a case is not
itself a litigated matter. It is an umbrella term that covers all matters of administration and adjudication
that occur between the filing of a bankruptcy petition and the conclusion of the case. See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 1002.
2. Bankruptcy jurisdiction is conferred in 28 U.S.C. § 1334, which provides that district courts
"shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all [bankruptcy] cases under title 11" of the United
States Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1994), "exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever
located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate," id.
§ 1334(e), and "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title I 1." Id. § 1334(b). The exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction is
divided between federal district courts and federal bankruptcy courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)
**
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3
from other grants of federal jurisdiction.

Outside of bankruptcy, federal courts consider abstention "the exception,

not the rule." 4 The Supreme Court has identified limited circumstances under
which federal district courts should refrain from exercising the jurisdiction
granted to them by Congress. Generally, these judicially created
nonbankruptcy abstention doctrines involve "exceptional circumstances" 5 in

which concerns for proper constitutional adjudication, 6 regard for federalstate relations 7 or wise judicial management8 are said to outweigh federal
jurisdictional interests. In balancing these competing interests, the Supreme
Court has held that a state's interest in having unsettled issues of state law
resolved in a state court is alone insufficient grounds for abstention from
federal jurisdiction. 9
Abstention is more frequently permitted in the bankruptcy context. 10

(permitting district courts to refer "any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising
under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11" to bankruptcy judges in district); id.
§ 157(b) (permitting bankruptcy judge to "hear and determine all cases under title 11, and all core
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in case under title 11," subject only to ordinary appellate
review); id. § 157(c) (permitting bankruptcy judge to "hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding
but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11," and to "submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law" for de novo review by district court, unless affected parties consent to greater
exercise ofjurisdiction by bankruptcy judge).
3. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); id. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction).
4. Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
5. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-90 (1959) ("The doctrine
of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its
jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a
controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this
doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court
would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.").
6. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (ordering district court to
defer decision on federal constitutional question until resolution of unsettled issues of state law by
state court).
7. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-34 (1943) (concluding that district court
should abstain from interfering in state efforts to resolve "basic problems of Texas policy" through
"unified method for the formation of policy"); see also Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. at 190
(reversing district court's decision to abstain from hearing eminent domain case over which it had
diversity jurisdiction, because case "present[s] no hazard of disrupting federal-state relations").
8. See Colorado River Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 817-18 (stating that, in exceptional
circumstances, considerations of wise judicial administration may warrant abstention without regard to
concerns for comity with state courts).
9. See, e.g., Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1943).
10. District courts are also required to abstain from exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction whenever
"related to" proceedings, pending in state court prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, can be
expeditiously resolved in that state forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1994). The statute requires:
Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim or State law cause of
action, related to a case under title I I but not arising under tide 11 or arising in a case under title
11, with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United States
absent [bankruptcy] jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss3/1

1998]

PERMISSIVE BANKRUPTCY ABSTENTION

District courts are permitted by statute to abstain "in the interest of justice, or
in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law."' Courts
are divided as to whether this standard incorporates the judicially created
abstention doctrines referred to above. Several courts of appeal have

concluded that it does not, and have upheld abstention from bankruptcy
jurisdiction where the state law at issue is not unsettled. One has gone so far
as to construe this provision to permit abstention from a proceeding

involving questions of federal nonbankruptcy law "in the interest ofjustice,"
although comity interests were absent,12 a conclusion that would constitute
reversible error outside the bankruptcy context. 13 In some of these decisions,
abstention is viewed as a matter within the discretion of the district court,
whereas generally district courts are "obligated not to decide state law claims
(or to stay their adjudication) where one of the abstention doctrines
articulated by the [Supreme] Court applies."' 14 Moreover, courts are often

influenced by arguments that abstention would expedite litigation in a
bankruptcy case, although outside of bankruptcy, a court may grant a

movant's request for abstention without considering the delay or expense
created for parties who chose to litigate in federal forums.'" Courts are
divided as to whether these efficiency concerns trump an interest in comity
with state courts, most notably in the context of requests to abstain from

such a proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of
appropriate jurisdiction.
Id.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1). Section 1334(c)(1) provides in full:
Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest ofjustice, or in the interest of comity
with State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding
arising under title I I or arising in or related to a case under title 11.
Id.
12. See Mathiasen's Tanker Indus. v. Apex Oil Co. (In re Apex Oil Co.), 980 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir.
1992).
13. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989)
(declining to find that Burford abstention was warranted when electric utility brought action in federal
district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on the grounds that actions of state rate-making
authority involved federal, not state, law).
14. City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 118 S. Ct. 523, 534 (1997).
15. See, e.g,, CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 325 (5th ed. 1994)
(discussing Pullman abstention and noting that in more than one instance "it has led to delays of many
years before the case was finally decided on its merits or limped to an inconclusive end"). The
Supreme Court has not been completely insensitive to the potential for delay and enhanced costliness
that abstention may create. In some instances, for example, it has suggested that certification of the
unsettled issue of state law might be a preferable procedure since certification "does of course in the
long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Lehman
Bros. v. Schien, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974). Nonetheless, outside the bankruptcy context, the delay
and expense of abstention is not explicitly balanced against comity interests that might be furthered by
a decision to abstain, as often is done in bankruptcy.
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exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction over mass tort litigation pending against a
debtor.
Should a distinct abstention doctrine govern in bankruptcy? Bankruptcy
jurisdiction differs significantly from other grants of federal jurisdiction in at
least two ways. 16 First, non-Article H1I bankruptcy judges exercise most
bankruptcy jurisdiction. Because bankruptcy judges do not enjoy life tenure,
their ability to enter final orders in litigation occurring in a bankruptcy
context is substantially limited both by statute17 and by Article III of the
United States Constitution.18 Second, bankruptcy jurisdiction differs
qualitatively from the federal question and diversity jurisdiction conferred on
federal district courts. In one sense, bankruptcy jurisdiction is broader than
16. There is another important distinction between the jurisdiction of federal bankruptcy and
district courts: Bankruptcy cases are procedurally distinct from the civil cases filed in district courts
because bankruptcy cases may or may not involve disputed matters. Moreover, when litigation occurs
in a bankruptcy case, it may or may not differ from other forms of civil litigation before district courts.
Litigation in bankruptcy cases can take one of two forms: adversary proceedings or contested matters.
Adversary proceedings in bankruptcy courts closely resemble civil cases in district courts; both are
commenced with a complaint, followed by an answer and discovery, and may result in a trial in which
the Federal Rules of Evidence apply. In other instances, bankruptcy litigation involves contested
matters which are defined in the FederalRules ofgankuptcy Procedureto be commenced by motion,
followed by abbreviated discovery and which result in a summary hearing.
This pragmatic distinction between bankruptcy and district courts is left to the footnotes because it
does not assist us in distinguishing between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy abstention. Throughout
this Article, I analyze the statutory provisions and judicial doctrines governing the abstention from
litigated proceedings that arise in or are related to a bankruptcy case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d)
(repealed 1984); 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1994). A separate statutory provision governs abstention
from an entire bankruptcy case-namely II U.S.C. § 305. This provision is entitled "Abstention" but
permits a district court to "dismiss a [title 11] case" or "suspend all proceedings in [such] a case" if
"the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension." 11
U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (1994). Section 305 raises the pragmatic distinction between bankruptcy courts and
district courts, in that it permits abstention from a bankruptcy case and not just the litigated
proceedings within the case, but discussion of this provision exceeds the scope of this Article.
17. The limited authority of non-Article IIbankruptcy courts is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 157. As
to "core" proceedings, defined only with a nonexclusive list of examples in section 157(b)(2), and
"noncore" proceedings as to which affected parties have consented to bankruptcy court jurisdiction,
bankruptcy courts are authorized to enter final orders subject only to ordinary appellate review. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1), (c)(2) (1994). Where the parties to a noncore proceeding have not consented to
the authority of the bankruptcy court, the court is authorized only to "hear" the matter, but not to
"determine" it. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). In these noncore proceedings, the bankruptcy court makes
factual and legal recommendations to the district court, who enters the final order in the proceeding
after reviewing these recommendations de novo. See id. For a more detailed discussion of the limited
jurisdiction of non-Article Imbankruptcy courts, see Susan Block-Lieb, The Cost ofa Non-Article III
Banhruptcy CourtSystem, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 498 (1998).
18. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (requiring that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish"); id. § I, cf. I (requiring that judges of federal courts vested by Congress with
"judicial Power of the United States" shall hold their offices "during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office").
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federal question jurisdiction, encompassing not only all proceedings "arising
under" the Bankruptcy Code but also those "arising in" or "related to" a
federal bankruptcy case. 19 Often, these arising in and related to proceedings
look solely to state law for their resolution. Because it is difficult to
characterize arising in and related to bankruptcy jurisdiction as a variant of
federal question jurisdiction, many think of this jurisdiction as a type of
supplemental jurisdiction 2 -jurisdiction supplementary to the federal
questions at the core of a bankruptcy case.21 On the other hand, bankruptcy
jurisdiction is narrower than either diversity or federal question jurisdiction
because it is defined according to a limited functional purpose-the
expeditious resolution of bankruptcy cases. To some extent, the institutional
and qualitative differences between bankruptcy jurisdiction and other grants
of federal jurisdiction justify distinct abstention doctrines. When the
differences among the federal grants of jurisdiction do not support distinct
rules for abstention, however, there is good reason to wonder whether the
distinctions should continue.
Parts I and H of this Article provide background discussions. Part I
discusses the abstention doctrines applied outside the bankruptcy context.
Part II describes the doctrines governing abstention from bankruptcy
jurisdiction. Because the development of the bankruptcy abstention doctrines
is complicated, Part II proceeds chronologically, beginning with the Supreme
Court's decision in Thompson v. MagnoliaPetroleum Co.,22 and concluding
with a discussion of case law interpreting the current permissive bankruptcy
abstention provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1), which was enacted with the
1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. Relying on this background
material, Part III contends that section 1334(c)(1) should be construed to
incorporate both the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy abstention doctrines.
Parts IV, V and VI consider the contours of bankruptcy abstention in light of

19. Compare 28 US.C. § 1334(b) (1994) (bankruptcy jurisdiction), with 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(federal question jurisdiction).
20. The power to adjudicate jurisdictionally insufficient state law claims or proceedings factually
related to jurisdictionally sufficient claims or proceedings refers to the doctrine of supplemental
jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction is the term currently used to describe the doctrines of ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute-A Constitutionaland Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 852 (1992).
21. See John T. Cross, CongressionalPower to Extend FederalJurisdictionto Disputes Outside
Article 111:
A CriticalAnalysis from the Perspective of Bankruptcy, 87 N.W. U. L. REV. 1188, 1251
(1993) (describing related to proceedings as "logically related to the federal cause of action in
bankruptcy," thus, forming "part of a single federal bankruptcy 'case' for purposes of Article IlT');
Susan Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Constitutional,
Statutory, and Policy Analysis, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 779-84 (1994) (agreeing that '"[r]elated to'
proceedings can also be viewed as a form of supplemental jurisdiction").
22. 309 U.S. 478,481(1940).
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the institutional and qualitative differences between bankruptcy jurisdiction
and other grants of federal jurisdiction. Part IV focuses on the constitutional
distinctions between the judicial authority of non-Article III bankruptcy
courts and Article III district courts, and concludes that there is no
constitutional basis for the substantially distinct grounds for abstention from
bankruptcy jurisdiction and from other grants of federal jurisdiction. Part V
considers whether the scope of the permissive bankruptcy abstention
provision should differ depending upon whether arising in and related to
proceedings are best characterized as a form of federal question or
supplemental jurisdiction. It contends that, no matter how bankruptcy
jurisdiction over proceedings arising under state law is categorized, questions
regarding the scope of section 1334(c)(1) are questions of statutory
construction. Read as such, the permissive bankruptcy abstention provision
should not be construed to adopt distinct standards for absention from
different sorts of bankruptcy proceedings. Part VI turns to the functional
purposes of the broad grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction-the expeditious
resolution of bankruptcy cases. Although Congress generally understood the
consolidation of all bankruptcy jurisdiction in a single federal forum as the
best means of accomplishing this bankruptcy goal of expeditiousness, there
may be circumstances in which efficiency in administration is better
accomplished through a delegation of judicial duties. Only in these limited
circumstances, however, should the functional distinction between
bankruptcy and district courts justify a broader abstention doctrine.
I. NONBANKRUPTCY ABSTENTION
The Supreme Court recognizes three circumstances in which it is
23
appropriate for district courts to abstain from exercising federal jurisdiction:
(1) abstention under the Pullman doctrine to avoid reaching a federal
constitutional question when the cause of action may be decided through
resolution of unsettled issues of state law; (2) abstention under Burford and

23. Courts and commentators differ on how to count the number of abstention doctrines. See
WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 323 n.3 ("The Supreme Court, the lower courts, and the commentators
differ on how many abstention doctrines there are. Respectable support can be found for classifying
the cases into two, three, four, or five categories. The number is of little significance, since the division
is mere organizational convenience."). To a large extent, this difference of opinion exists because there
exists a great deal of overlap in these abstention doctrines. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S.
1, 11 n.9 (1987) ("The various types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts
must try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a complex of considerations designed to soften the tensions
inherent in a system that contemplates parallel judicial processes."). But see New Orleans Public Serv.,
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) (noting that "the policy considerations
supporting Burford and Younger are sufficiently distinct to justify independent analyses").
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related doctrines to avoid unnecessary conflict with the administration by a
state of its local affairs; (3) abstention under the ColoradoRiver doctrine to
avoid duplicative litigation in state and federal courts. Absent these
"exceptional circumstances," the Court has not sanctioned abstention solely
to permit state courts to resolve questions of unsettled state law. Abstention is
distinct from the discretion of a federal district court to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims related to claims over which
the court has diversity or federal question jurisdiction. Concerning the latter,
district courts have far greater discretion to defer to state court resolution of
unsettled issues of state law.
A. Pullman Abstention

In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,24 the Supreme Court held that
abstention is permitted when a claim that state action violates the United
States Constitution is made in a federal district court, but the federal
constitutional issue may be avoided through resolution of issues of unsettled
state law. 25 There, Pullman Company sought to enjoin enforcement of an
order of the Texas Railroad Commission on both federal and state law
grounds. It asserted that the order violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and,
in the alternative, that the Commission was not authorized under Texas law
to issue the order in question. The district court had federal question
jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issue,' 6 and supplemental jurisdiction
to decide the issue of state law.2 7 Nonetheless, a unanimous Court stated,
In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by
making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a
state adjudication.... The resources of equity are equal to an
adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as
the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication.'
Pullman abstention is only appropriate when resolution of the state law
issue might require considering whether the state action violates the
Constitution.2 9 It should only be invoked where the state law is "fairly subject

24. 312U.S.496,500(1941).
25. See WRIGHT, supranote 15, at 324.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (granting federal question jurisdiction).
27. See Siler v. Louisville & Nashville IR., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). Thus, the Court in Pullman
both abstained from the federal question jurisdiction and declined to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claim.
28. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500.
29. See WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 325 (noting that Pullman abstention is inappropriate "if the
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to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the
federal constitutional question." 30 Moreover, Pullman abstention should not
be ordered if the state statute is unambiguous, or if state courts have already
the Supreme Court
authoritatively construed its provisions.3 ' In Pullman,
32
clear.",
from
"far
as
issue
at
law
state
the
characterized
The Supreme Court in Pullman did not authorize the dismissal of the
federal action. Instead, it ordered the district court to abstain from deciding
the federal constitutional question but to retain jurisdiction until the question
of state law was resolved.33 As a result, Pullman abstention is often criticized
as a time consuming and expensive means of preserving comity with state
courts.3 4 In one case, the Supreme Court indicated that it would not ignore
the fact that Pullman "abstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication
in many courts ... thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for
an undue length of time," and held that, as a result, "special circumstances"
are required to justify an application of the Pullman doctrine.35
B. Burford Abstention
Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 36 is generally cited for the proposition that
abstention is appropriate "to avoid needless conflict with the administration
by a state of its own affairs. 37 In Burford, the Supreme Court held that a

constitutional issue would not be avoided or changed no matter now the [state] statute is construed").
30. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965), quoted in Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289,306 (1979).
31. See WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 325 (noting that Pullman abstention will not be ordered "if the
state law is clear on its face, or if its meaning has already been authoritatively decided by the state
courts").
32. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,499 (1941).
33. See id. at 500.
34. See WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 325-26 ("The price of Pullman-type abstention is not cheap.
In a number of well-known cases it has led to delays of many years before the case was finally decided
on its merits or limped to an inconclusive end. This delay and expense can only be justified as the
price that must be paid to satisfy the exigent demands of federalism and the vital policy of judicial
review that dictates against unnecessary resolution of a federal constitutional issue.").
35. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964); see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 140 & n.3 (1970) (upholding decision not to abstain from resolving constitutionality of
narrow and specific-although ambiguous-state statute because any delay in settling issue would
have resulted in substantial economic losses).
36. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
37. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 328 (but noting that "neither this nor any other attempt at defining
the class of cases in which this type of abstention is proper is very precise"); see also New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (summarizing Burford
abstention doctrine as applying "when there are 'difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar'
or "where the 'exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be
disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public
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federal district court should have dismissed a suit attacking the validity of an
order of the Texas Railroad Commission granting Burford permission "to
drill four wells on a small plot of land in the East Texas oil field. ' 38 The court
deemed abstention appropriate because it found the proration of gas and oil
and the regulation of the gas and oil industry to involve "basic problems of
Texas policy," such that "equitable discretion should be exercised to give the
Texas courts the first opportunity to consider them."3 9 Because it found state
procedures "expeditious and adequate," and federal intervention potentially
"dangerous" to the success of the state's regulatory scheme, the Court
concluded that "a sound respect for the independence of state action requires
the federal equity court to stay its hand." 40
The Supreme Court has applied the Burford doctrine to permit abstention
when the state law at issue did not involve the state regulation of an industry
or practice. For example, in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux,4' the Court upheld a district court's abstention in a diversity case
that questioned the propriety of condemnation under an unclear state
statute.42 Similarly, the Court in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co.,43
ordered the district court to abstain so that a state court could decide a
question of state water law that was both novel and of vital concern to New
Mexico.
In other instances, the Court has authorized Burford-type abstention to
permit state courts to resolve issues viewed as peculiarly local in their effect,
although the state law at issue was not unsettled. For example, in
Ankenbrandt v. Richards,44 the Court affirmed in dicta the so-called

concern"); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1975)
(same).
38. Burford,319 U.S. at 316-17. Jurisdiction over the cause of action was based both on diversity
of citizenship and an allegation that the order denied Sun Oil Company due process of law. See id. at
317.
39. Id. at 332.
40. Id. at 333-34. The Court stated:
The State provides a unified method for the formation of policy and determination of cases by the
Commission and by the state courts. The judicial review of the Commission's decisions in the
state courts is expeditious and adequate. Conflicts in the interpretation of state law, dangerous to
the success of state policies, are almost certain to result from the intervention of the lower federal
courts. On the other hand, if the state procedure is followed from the Commission to the State
Supreme Court, ultimate review of the federal questions is fully preserved here.
d.
41. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
42. See id. at 30-31. But see County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959)
(reversing the district court's abstention in a diversity action questioning the propriety of
condemnation under a state statute regarded by Supreme Court as clear).
43. 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
44. 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
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"domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction, agreeing that district
courts should not interfere with the jurisdiction of a state court to grant a
divorce, set and enforce awards of alimony or child support, and determine
paternity.45 The Court has also protected the jurisdiction of state courts over
local matters such as nuisance, 4 state and local taxation,47 and criminal
actions brought by state or local officials.48
Whether application of the Burford doctrine authorizes the district court
to dismiss or remand, or merely to stay, the federal action depends, in part,
on the nature of the relief sought in the federal action. Where equitable relief
is requested, the district court can, in exceptional circumstances, abstain from
exercising its jurisdiction by either staying the federal action, by remanding
the federal action to the state courts or by dismissing the federal action in
favor of a pending state suit. Where purely legal damages are requested,
however, the abstaining federal court can only "enter a stay order that
postpones adjudication
of the dispute, not.., dismiss the federal suit
9
altogether.A
C. Colorado River Abstention
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States,50 the
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a federal action in favor of a pending
action in state court. In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that
district courts generally should not stay or dismiss federal actions merely
because a similar action is pending before a state court.5 1 It, nonetheless,
conceded that dismissal in favor of a pending state action is appropriate in

45. See id.at 694-95.
46. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (permitting abstention from federal
jurisdiction attacking state nuisance proceedings that sought closure of place exhibiting obscene films;
nuisance action found antecedent to criminal prosecution).
47. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943) (permitting abstention
from federal action questioning collection of state tax receipts); Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestem Ry.,
284 U.S. 530 (1932) (holding that district court did not have jurisdiction as court of equity because
legal remedy was available under state law); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 526 (1932) (stating
that the remedy is in the state court unless a federal question is involved or the essential elements of
federal jurisdiction exist).

48. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (requiring abstention where federal jurisdiction
invoked to restrain continuance of state criminal proceeding, absent showing of bad faith, harassment
or patently invalid state statute); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
49. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 719 (1996).
50. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
51. See id.at 818 (stating that "the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to
the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration are
considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention").
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The Court viewed the case before it as one of those

exceptional cases, finding a clearly evinced federal interest in avoiding

"piecemeal adjudication of water rights" 53-a policy that it viewed as closely
related to the policy of deferring to the court that first acquires possession of
disputed property. 4 Moreover, it viewed this interest in a unified
proceeeding to determine the allocation of water rights as overriding federal
jurisdictional interests, particularly in light of a federal statute permitting

concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts over controversies

involving federal water rights.55 These, and other factors, were found to favor
dismissal of the federal action.56
57
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,
the Court reiterated and clarified 58 its statement that abstention in deference
of concurrent state court proceedings should occur only in exceptional
circumstances. The hospital commenced an action in state court seeking a
declaration that it owed nothing to Mercury Construction and that, by failing
timely to demand arbitration, Mercury had waived its contractual right to

seek arbitration of the dispute. Within weeks, Mercury commenced an action
in federal court to compel arbitration under section 4 of the United States

Arbitration Act. Affirming the Fourth Circuit's reversal of the district court's
stay of the federal proceeding pending resolution of the suit before the state
court, the Supreme Court concluded that, unlike Colorado River, there were

52. Id. In describing these exceptional circumstances, the Court identified several important
factors:
It has been held, for example, that the court first assuming jurisdiction over property may exercise
that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.... In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal
in the event of an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, a federal court may also consider such
factors as the inconvenience of the federal forum; the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation;
and the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums.
Id. (citations omitted). The court continued, noting that no single factor is determinative and that
"[o]nly the clearest ofjustifications will warrant dismissal." Id. at 819.
53. Id. at 819; see also 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994) (granting "consent to join the United States as
defendant in ...suit[s]," inter alia, to "adjudicat[e] rights to use the water of a river system," where
the United States owns or "isin the process of acquiring [suchl water rights").
54. See ColoradoRiver, 424 U.S. at 819.
55. See id.
56. See id.
at 820 (also finding significant that federal action had not progressed beyond filing of
complaint, that state water rights were also involved in the dispute, that 300 miles separated the federal
and state courts with concurrent jurisdiction and that the federal government was a party to the state
court proceeding).
57. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
58. But see Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (reversing writ of mandamus, in a
divided opinion, and ordering district court to proceed immediately with concurrent federal action);
WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 337 (describing Will as "mudd[ying]" the exceptional circumstances
standard set forth in ColoradoRiver).
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no exceptional circumstances to justify abstention in this case.59 Most
importantly, the Court noted that federal law would govern whether Mercury
had waived its right to arbitration or not, and stated that "the presence of
federal-law issues must always be a major consideration weighing against
surrender., 60 It also viewed "the probable inadequacy of the state-court
proceeding to protect Mercury's rights" as militating against abstention in
6

this instance. 1
The Supreme Court recently held that the exceptional circumstances
standard, first articulated in Colorado River and later applied in Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital,did not govern a district court's decision to stay a

federal declaratory judgment action during the pendency of a parallel state
court action. Instead, in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,62 the Court held that this
determination was within the discretion of the federal district court. 63 In
reaching this decision, the Court relied on its earlier holding in Brillhartv.
Excess Insurance Co.,64 and the language of the Federal Declaratory

Judgments Act.65 The Court concluded that "[i]n the declaratory judgment
context, the normal principle that federal courts should adjudicate claims
within their jurisdiction6 6 yields to considerations of practicality and wise
judicial administration.

59. See Moses H. Cone MemorialHosp., 460 U.S. at 14.
60. Id. at 26.
61. Id.
62. 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
63. See id.
at 286.
64. 316 U.S. 491 (1942). The Court in Wilton felt the need to reaffirm its prior holding in
Brillhartbecause the validity and scope of this earlier decision had been confused and questioned by
dicta in the Court's decisions in Colorado River, Will and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. See
Wilton, 515 U.S. at 283-86 (discussing this confusion).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1988). The Court in Wilton stated:
Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts
unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants. On its face,
the statute provides that a court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such a declaration."... The statute's textual commitment to discretion, and the
breadth of leeway we have always understood it to suggest, distinguish the declaratory judgment
context from other areas of the law in which concepts of discretion surface.
Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286-87 (citations omitted).
66. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288. But see Youell v. Exxon Corp., 74 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying
Wilton, on remand from Supreme Court, and reaffirming its conclusion that district court had abused
its discretion in staying this federal declaratory judgment action pending resolution of parallel state
court proceeding because, distinct from Wilton, this declaratory judgment action raised "novel issues
of federal admiralty law" better resolved in federal forum); NYLife Distrib., Inc. v. The Adherence
Group, Inc., 72 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 1995) (extending Wilton's discretionary standard to district court's
decision to dismiss federal interpleader action in favor of parallel interpleader action pending in state
court).
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D. Unsettled Issues of State Law
Unsettled issues of state law in a diversity action are not, by themselves, a
sufficient justification for abstention, because the grant of diversity
jurisdiction obligates the federal district court to decide issues of state law as
though it were a state court.67 The Supreme Court first articulated this general
rule in Meredith v. City of Winter Haven68 and has cited it with approval
numerous time since.69 Notwithstanding this general rule, the Supreme Court
has regularly endorsed the use of certification procedures that many states
have established by statute.70 For example, in Lehman Bros. v. Schein,71 the
Court vacated a decision of the Second Circuit so that the court of appeals
might 2certify an unsettled issue of Florida law to the Florida Supreme
7

Court.

Where federal jurisdiction derives, not from the parties'

diverse

citizenship, but instead from a federal question, the existence of unsettled
issues of state law in the federal action is, on its own, insufficient grounds for
abstention. However, if resolution of these unsettled issues of state law

67. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187 (1947) ("For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a
federal court is 'in effect, only another court of the State.').
68. 320 U.S. 228 (1943). In Meredith, Chief Justice Stone broadly announced:
In the absence of some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of the
jurisdiction conferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant its nonexercise, it has from the
first been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to
decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment. When such
exceptional circumstances are not present, denial of that opportunity by the federal courts merely
because the answers to the questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet been
given by the highest court of the state, would thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional act
Id. at 234-35 (citations omitted). The Court in Meredith indicated that only upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances would abstention in favor of state court resolution of unsettled issues of
state law be warranted in a diversity action. It found no exceptional circumstances justifying abstention
where unsettled issues of state law were raised in a diversity action. See id. at 235-38.
69. See, e.g., McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673 n.5 (1963) (citing Meredith, and
stating that "where Congress creates a head of federal jurisdiction which entails a responsibility to
adjudicate the claim on the basis of state law, viz., diversity of citizenship .... we hold that difficulties
and perplexities of state law are no reason for referral of the problem to the state court"); Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976) (citing Meredith for the proposition
that "the mere potential for conflict in the results of adjudications, does not, without more, warrant
staying exercise of federal jurisdiction").
70. For a discussion of these statutes, see 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4248 nn.30-33 (2d ed. 1988).
71. 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
72. See id. at 389-92. The Court in Lehman Bros. stated:
We do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law and where the certification procedure
is available, resort to it is obligatory. It does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and
resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism. Its use in a given case rests in the
sound discretion of the federal court.
Id. at 390-91 (footnote omitted).
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would preclude reaching a federal constitutional question, Pullman
abstention may be appropriate. Moreover, where federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction extends to claims involving unsettled issues of state law, the
Supreme Court has held in Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.73 that a
bankruptcy court should, in exceptional circumstances, abstain in favor of
state court resolution of these issues. 74 The Supreme Court's decisions on
abstention from bankruptcy jurisdiction are complex and somewhat
enigmatic; their discussion is left for Part II. Nonetheless, although the
Supreme Court has not clearly defined the contours of its bankruptcy
abstention doctrine, it also has not indicated in this case law an intention to
deviate from the general rule that the mere presence of unsettled issues of
state law does not alone justify an abdication of federal jurisdiction.
E. Discretionto Decline SupplementalJurisdiction
Federal courts defer to state courts for the resolution of issues of state law
on grounds other than abstention. Where the federal district court has neither
federal question nor diversity jurisdiction of state law claims, but where the
state law claims arise out of a "common nucleus of operative fact" with those
over which it does have federal question or diversity jurisdiction,75 then the
district court may in its discretion exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
these otherwise jurisdictionally insufficient claims.76 But because
supplemental jurisdiction has traditionally been viewed as discretionary with
the federal court, it is also generally accepted that the district court may
decline to exercise this discretionary supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law claims.
For example, in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,7 the Supreme Court
noted that the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state
law claims
"need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to
78
exist."

73. 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
74. See id.at 483.
75. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,725 (1966).
76. See id. The Court in Gibbs stated:
The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
court ... The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But
if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he
would ordinarily be expected to trythem all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming
substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.
Id. (citation omitted).
77. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
78. Id. at 726. The Court stated:
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[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even thought not
insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be
dismissed as well. Similarly, if it appears that the state issues

substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of
the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought,

the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left for
resolution to state tribunals. There may, on the other hand, be
situations in which the state claim is so closely tied to questions of
federal policy that the argument for exercise of pendent jurisdiciton is
particularly strong.... Finally, there may be reasons independent of
jurisdictional considerations, such as the likelihood of jury confusion
in treating divergent legal theories of relief, that would justify

separating state and federal claims for trial. If so, jurisdiction should
ordinarily be refused. 79
With its enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Congress
codified the judicially-created doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction,
which together it referred to as "supplemental jurisdiction.""0 Section 1367(a)

provides for "supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article IH of the United States
Constitution," and legislative history indicates that this reference to the
constitutional limits of the doctrine was intended to codify "the scope of
supplemental jurisdiction first articulated by the Supreme Court in United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs.''8 1 Section 1367(c) goes on to codify, consistent with

It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of
plaintiff's right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction
over state claims, even though bound to apply state law to them. Needless decisions of state law
should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by
procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.
Id.
79. Id. at 726-27 (citations omitted); accordCarnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
(1988). In Carnegie-Mellon University, the Court stated:
Under Gibbs, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the
litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, faimess, and comity in order to decide
whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state law
claims.... As articulated by Gibbs, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction thus is a doctrine of
flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that
most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns and values.
Id.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. IV. 1992).
81. H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, at 28-29 & n. 15 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6874-
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Gibbs, the discretionary nature of an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
This section permits district courts to "decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim 82E if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction. 3
Section 1367(c) has
been interpreted broadly, consistent with the principles
84
set forth in Gibbs.
The ability of a district court to decline to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction is distinct from the abstention doctrines discussed above. A
determination whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is purely a
matter for the discretion of the court, whereas "district courts may be
obligated not to decide state law claims (or to stay their adjudication) where
one of the abstention doctrines... applies. 85

II.

ABSTENTION FROM BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION

A. Bankruptcy Abstention Under the FormerBankruptcy Act of 1898
Any discussion of the doctrine governing abstention from bankruptcy
jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 must begin with the Supreme
Court's decision in Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 86 It would be
deceptive to end the discussion with a study of this decision because
bankruptcy courts more often deferred to their state court brethern under the
1898 Bankruptcy Act than just in the narrow circumstances identified in
Thompson.
1. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.
The Supreme Court's decision in Thompson is readily distinguishable

82. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
84. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Int'l College of Surgeons, 118 S.Ct. 523, 533 (1997) (noting that
section 1367(c) "codifies" principles intially articulated in cases such as Gibbs and Cohill).
85. Id.
86. 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
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from the Supreme Court abstention decisions discussed above on two
grounds: First, Thompson is one of the few Supreme Court decisions to
address the propriety of abstaining from an exercise of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction. Second, although RailroadCommission v. Pullman generally
is accepted as having initiated the doctrine of abstention, Thompson actually
predates Pullman.
In Thompson, a rich oil field was discovered in an area bisected by a right
of way granted to the Missouri-Illinois Railroad Company. Guy A.
Thompson, the trustee for the reorganizing railroad, claimed the oil as
property of the estate, arguing that the right of way granted to the railroad a
fee simple in the narrow strip of land beneath the tracks. 88 Magnolia
Petroleum and others claimed the oil, contending that the right of way had
granted a mere easement to the railroad. 89 Illinois intermediate appellate
courts had divided on the issue of whether a right of way conveyed to a
railroad a fee simple or easement in the land beneath the tracks. 90
The Supreme Court held that the district court sitting in bankruptcy had
"summary" bankruptcy jurisdiction over the oil, 91 reasoning that this
jurisdiction depended not on ownership, but on the trustee's possession of the
oil as of the commencement of the case.92 Because the trustee was in
possession of the right of way under a claim of fee ownership, he was held to

87. Only a few other Supreme Court decisions address abstention from bankruptcy jurisdiction.
See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952) (upholding bankruptcy court's deference to federal
administrative agency); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946) (applying Burford
abstention doctrine to bankruptcy context); Mangus v. Miller, 317 U.S. 178, 185 (1942) (indicating in
dicta that administration of interest of one of two joint tenants in land contract in farm reorganization
proceeding was not "insurmountable" because bankruptcy court might defer to state court resolution of
difficult issues of land finance law).
88. See Thompson, 309 U.S. at 479.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 484.
91. Under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, bankruptcy referees (or bankruptcy courts, as they
were called after 1972) exercised limited summary jurisdiction of bankruptcy litigation. At bottom,
summary jurisdiction was a form of in rem jurisdiction-jurisdiction over the res that constituted
property of the debtor's estate in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Ex ParteBaldwin, 291 U.S. 610 (1934). Courts
construed the 1898 Act to grant to bankruptcy courts summary jurisdiction over (1) matters involving
the administration of the bankruptcy case, (2) disputes involving property in the actual or constructive
possession of the bankruptcy court, (3) proceedings in which the parties had consented to bankruptcy
court jurisdiction (express, or impliedly by failing to object in time, or impliedly by filing a proof of
claim or otherwise similarly participating in the bankruptcy case) and (4) a few limited matters over
which the statute expressly granted jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY §§ 2.01-2.03[2] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1998). In all other instances,
bankruptcy-related disputes were litigated in federal court, if there was federal jurisdiction, or state
court, if there was not. See id. § 3.01 [1 ]b]Eiv].
92. See Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 482 (1940) ("[P]ossession of those
lands under claim of fee simple ownership by the railroad and later by the trustee was an adequate
basis for the District Court's summary jurisdiction.").
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have been in possession of the oil. Although the Supreme Court found

summary bankruptcy jurisdiction, it concluded that the lower court had
abused its discretion by exercising this jurisdiction. 93 Rather than attempt to
resolve this unsettled issue of state law, the Court held that the district court
should have abstained in favor of a state court resolution of the issue:
A court of bankruptcy has exclusive and nondelegable control over
[the] administration of an estate in its possession. But the proper
exercise of that control may, where the interests of the estate and the
parties will best be served, lead the bankruptcy court to consent to
submission to state courts of particular controversies involving
unsettled questions of state94property law and arising in the course of
bankruptcy administration.
Thompson, although a bankruptcy decision, can be understood as a
forerunner of the Pullman abstention doctrine. 95 Thompson holds that district
courts should abstain from exercising their federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
where resolution of an unsettled question of state property law would obviate
that jurisdiction. Resolution of the unsettled state property law at issue in
Thompson would have rendered the exercise of federal bankruptcy

jurisdiction over the disputed oil unnecessary because summary bankruptcy
jurisdiction was a form of in rem jurisdiction. If, under state law, the trustee
in Thompson had no right to possess the oil, then there also was no summary

93. Contemporary commentary was most critical of this aspect of the Court's holding in
Thompson, since in earlier cases courts had viewed any surrender of summary jurisdiction as
discretionary with the bankruptcy court upon petition for leave to institute suit in another court. See
Recent Cases, FederalJurisdiction-Effectof UndeterminedState Law, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 727, 728
(1940) ("That the instant case marks a departure from a former bankruptcy practice can hardly be
doubted. The holding that the bankruptcy court, without ever having been petitioned by one of the
parties for leave to institute suit in another court, must relinquish a discretionary jurisdiction in order to
permit the controversy to be govemed by an as yet undetermined state law, is without precedent.");
Recent Cases, Federal Courts-Questionsof State Law-Bankruptcy Court Ordered to Direct Trustee
to Proceed in State Courtfor Determination of Unsettled Question ofState Law, 53 HARV. L. REV.
1394, 1395 (1940) [hereinafter Federal Courts] ("By compelling the bankruptcy court to take the
initiative in divesting itself of jurisdiction to determine this controversy, the Court seems to have
outrun even the most far-reaching implications of its previous decisions.").
94. Thompson, 309 U.S. at 483. The Court concluded that abstention was appropriate:
Unless the matter is referred to the State courts, upon subsequent decision by the Supreme Court
of Illinois it may appear that rights in local property of parties to the proceeding have-by the
accident of federal jurisdiction-been determined contrary to the law of the State, which in such
matters is supreme.
Id. at 484.
95. See MfV Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 596 (1959) (describing Thompson as variation
of Pullman abstention); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 489-92 (1949) (comparing Pullman abstention
to Thompson abstention doctrines).
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jurisdiction over the disputed

oil.96

The Pullman doctrine similarly provides

that district courts should abstain from exercising their federal question

jurisdiction where resolution of an unsettled question of state law would
avoid the need to determine whether a state practice or procedure violates the
Constitution of the United States.
Whether Thompson should be construed this narrowly is an open
question. The Supreme Court has relied on Thompson in only a handful of
cases, and in none of these decisions did it elaborate on the contours of the
judicially-created permissive bankruptcy abstention doctrine. Mangus v.
Miller97 is the only one of these decisions that even arguably involves
bankruptcy abstention.9"
In Mangus, the debtor and his wife purchased a farm as joint tenants
under a land contract. In default several years later, the husband alone (as he

alone appeared to be an eligible farmer) filed a petition for farm
reorganization under section 75 of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The
effect of this petition was to stay the forfeiture action pending against the

debtor's interest in the joint tenancy, but not to stay it as to the interest of the
nondebtor wife. Following the forfeiture of the nondebtor wife's joint interest

in the land contract, the lender-seller brought an action challenging the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to administer the affected land as
property of the debtor's estate in bankruptcy. The court of appeals agreed,
dismissing the petition because it viewed the difficulties of administering the

debtor's interest in farm reorganization proceedings as "insurmountable."
The Supreme Court reversed. 99
We perceive no insurmountable obstacle, if the bankruptcy court is so

96. That the unsettled question of state law should pertain to state property law follows from the
nature of the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898-the debtor's property
interests determined the scope of summary bankruptcy jurisdiction. Federal courts were said to have
summary jurisdiction over all property in the actual or constructive possession of the trustee in
bankruptcy. If the trustee was in possession of the property, the court had summary jurisdiction to
determine whether the property was property of the bankruptcy estate. Ownership was important to
this exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction in that a determination that the debtor's only interest in the
property was possessory meant that the property was not property of the estate-because it could not
be distributed to creditors, the trustee would abandon it to the true owner.
97. 317U.S. 178 (1942).
98. Twice the Supreme Court has applied the Burford abstention doctrine to the bankruptcy
context, citing both Burford and Thompson in support, but providing no other explanation of its
citations. See supra note 87. Moreover, on several occasions, the Court cited Thompson (along with
Pullman) to distinguish it from Meredith-describing both Thompson and Pullman as constituting
exceptional circumstances justifying abstention in favor of state court resolution of unsettled issues of
state law. See, e.g., Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 489-90 (1949) (discussing Supreme Court
precedent distinguishing Meredith in dicta).
99. See Mangus, 317 U.S. at 184.
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advised, to the exercise of its jurisdiction so as to permit the parties to
ascertain their respective rights by an appropriate proceeding in the
state courts. See Thompson v. MagnoliaPetroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478.
While such practice is to be regarded as exceptional, the
circumstances which here suggest it appear to be exceptional.10 0
This discussion is probably best viewed as dictum, in that the Court was
not stating that the bankruptcy court was required to defer resolution of these
difficult issues of state-land-finance law to the state court. It is telling dictum,
however. Decided only two years after Thompson, Mangus describes the
practice of abstaining from an exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction as
requiring "exceptional" justification.10 ' The Court in Mangus also describes
the facts involved in that case as "appear[ing] to be exceptional" on factual
grounds similar to those present in Thompson.10 2 In both cases, state law was
substantially unclear on how to define an interest in property; in both cases,
clarification of the property interest would have resolved questions regarding
the propriety of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the asset.
Supreme Court decisions which generally discuss the appropriateness of
abstention to avoid federal court resolution of unsettled issues of state law
provide additional support for a narrow construction of Thompson. In
Meredith v. City of Winter Park,'°3 the Court rejected the notion that the
presence of unresolved state law should form the basis of abstention from an
exercise of diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, in subsequent cases, the
Supreme Court also generally declined to find that a lower federal court had
04
abused its discretion by deciding theretofore unresolved issues of state law.1
In upholding these federal court resolutions of state law, the Supreme Court
distinguished both Pullman and Thompson as involving "special
circumstances."' 1 5 For example, in Propperv. Clark,10 6 the Court described

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 186.
Id.
Id.
320 U.S. 228 (1943).

104. See M/V Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 595-96 (1959) (rejection similar suggestion,
but dealing with the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 489-92 (1949)
(rejecting suggestion that judgments should be vacated and case remanded to, and held by, district
court, until parties can secure decision from state courts on issue of state law important to resolution of
federal action under Trading With Enemies Act).
105. Propper,337 U.S. at 492 (rejecting the suggestion that "a decision in this case in the federal
courts should be delayed until the courts of New York have settled the issue of state law" and noting

that "submission of special issues [of unresolved state law] is a useful device in judicial administration
... but in the absence of special circumstances... it is not to be used to impede the normal course of
action where federal courts have been granted jurisdiction of the controversy" (citations to Pullman,

Thompson and other similar decisions omitted)).
106. 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
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the special circumstances involved in these cases, as follows:
[Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. and RailroadCommission v.
Pullman Co.] where this Court required submission of single issues,
excised from the controversy, to state courts were cases in equity. The
discretion of equity as to the terms upon which it would grant its
remedies, in the light of our rule to avoid an interpretation of the
Federal Constitution unless necessary, was relied upon to justify a
departure from normal procedure. In the [Thompson] case, we directed
the trustee [to] file plenary proceedings to determine title in a state
court litigation necessarily complete in itself.... Otherwise in sending
a fragment of the litigation to a state court, the federal court might find
itself blocked by res judicata, with the result that the entire federal
controversy would be
ousted from the federal courts, where it was
07
placed by Congress.1
Although Propperdoes not expressly limit abstention under Thompson to
circumstances under which the resolution of unsettled issues of state law
determines the presence or absence of summary bankruptcy jurisdiction, it
does limit abstention under this doctrine to circumstances under which state
court resolution of unsettled issues would not preclude the bankruptcy court
from reaching interrelated federal law issues present in the proceeding.
Moreover, Propper clearly does not suggest that Thompson generally
requires abstention from bankruptcy court resolution of unresolved issues of
state law.
Under the former Act of 1898, courts of appeals understood the
Thompson doctrine to be narrow. In general, these courts upheld decisions to
abstain from resolving unsettled issues of state property law in bankruptcy
where resolution of the state law issue would have obviated the need to
exercise summary bankruptcy jurisdiction over the disputed property.108

107. Id. at 491-92. Similarly, the Court in MV Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 596 (1959),
rejected the argument that
the judgment should be vacated, and the case remanded to the District Court to be held until the
parties can secure from the courts of New Jersey a decision upon the controlling and seriously
doubtful question of state law, and reasoned that under traditional principles of equitable
abstention this Court has often followed such a course for the limited and obviously wise purpose
of avoiding unnecessary resolution of constitutional issues. Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496; ... Cf Thompson v. MagnoliaPetroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478.

Id.
108. See First Nat'l Bank v. Reed, 306 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1962) (concluding that it had "no real
idea what [the] Supreme Court of Vermont ... would hold," reversing district court's conclusions of
state property and public utilities law and remanding with instructions to abstain in favor of Vermont
state court); Gramil Weaving Corp. v. Raindeer Fabrics, 185 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950) (finding
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Similarly, courts of appeals affirmed decisions declining to abstain where the
state law at issue was not sufficiently unsettled. 10 9
2. Deference to State Courts Under the 1898 Act
The decisions that cite and discuss Thompson do not fully describe the
extent to which federal district and bankruptcy courts deferred to state courts
in adjudicating bankruptcy cases under the former 1898 Act. Although

Thompson was viewed as a narrow grounds for abstaining from summary
bankruptcy jurisdiction, this does not mean that bankruptcy-related matters
were rarely litigated in state courts under the former Bankruptcy Act. On the

contrary, under the Act, "[a] bankruptcy court commonly sen[t] its trustee
into state courts to have complex questions of local law adjudicated."' "10
However, this deference to state courts did not always involve abstention.
Bankruptcy courts often sent their trustees to state court because summary

jurisdiction often did not extend to permit resolution of the state law
summary jurisdiction over action to determine whether chattel mortgage had attached under
Massachusetts law, but concluding that bankruptcy court should decline to exercise this jurisdiction on
remand because issue of unsettled state property law was better resolved in pending state court action
that would bind all affected parties); see also Scroggins v. Goldstein, Frazier & Murphy (In re
Kaleidoscope, Inc.), 25 B.R 729 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (reversing bankruptcy court's order to turnover legal
files amassed by debtor's former law firm in the course of its prepetition representation of debtor and
related individuals and entities and holding that abstention from summary jurisdiction over files was
appropriate because, in pending law suit state court had previously ruled that files merited protection
as work product, state court was in best position to resolve unsettled questions under state law as to
whether former client or former attorneys held property interest in such files).
109. See In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.L, 654 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1981)
(distinguishing Thompson on grounds that issue on appeal merely raised problems of factual
complexity, and not unsettled questions of state property law); In re Boston and Maine Corp., 596 F.2d
2 (1st Cir. 1979) (concluding that issue of whether track materials were realty or personalty was not
such an unsettled question of property law in New Hampshire as to have required federal
reorganization court to abstain from determining it); Kiedan v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. (In re
Mohammed), 327 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1964) (declining to hold that district court should have abstained
in favor of state court ruling on issue of perfection of chattel mortgage on grounds that absence of case
on point did not render state law unsettled); White v. Schwartz, 302 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(holding that bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in determining title to liquor store, although
liquor store was in probate, where probate court would not have had jurisdiction to determine title to
assets in probate); Marian Corp. v. Bray, 235 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1956) (concluding that bankruptcy
court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to sue trustee in state court to recover tract of land
because there existed no unsettled questions of state law); see also United Auto., Aircraft & Agric.
Implement Workers v. Davis (In re Muskegon Motor Specialities Co.), 313 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1073),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 832 (1963) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to surrender jurisdiction of employees' claims for vacation pay although under collective
bargaining agreement such claims would have been subject to arbitration agreement).
110. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'r, 375 U.S. 411, 423 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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issues. 11' Summary jurisdiction was a far narrower grant ofjurisdiction than
that conferred by the current bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions. Under the
former Act, if the bankruptcy court did not have summary jurisdiction over
an action, the trustee was required to commence a plenary action, either in a
federal district court or a state court.1 12 And, like all other litigants, the trustee
was required to establish federal jurisdiction to commence a plenary action in
federal district court. 113 If the action was not between citizens of different
states and did not present a federal question, the trustee would have been
required to bring the plenary action in state court.'14

Where the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction was questionable, it
was said that the court could permissibly decline to exercise that

jurisdiction."l5 Where the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction would not
have permitted it to resolve all the claims between the parties, again, the
court had discretion to decline to exercise this jurisdiction over some of the

111. See, e.g., Texas v. Donoghue, 302 U.S. 284 (1937) (concluding that Texas should be
permitted to bring suit in state court to obtain confiscation order pertaining to oil that allegedly had
been produced or transported unlawfully prepetition, because unlawful production or transportation
effected forfeiture of oil under state law and bankruptcy court could not have had summary jurisdiction
of forfeited oil). One contemporary commentator noted:
It has been repeatedly affirmed that a bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies relating to property rightfully in its custody, including questions of title. Assertion of
this jurisdiction, however, is discretionary with the lower court which may properly countenance
or initiate proceedings in state tribunals to decide rights dependent on local law. And, where such
proceedings would not embarrass administration of the bankrupt's estate, refusal to permit them
has been condemned as an abuse of discretion.
FederalCourts,supra note 93, at 1395 (citations omitted).
112. See supra note 91 (defining distinction between summary and plenary bankruptcy
jurisdiction).
113. Seeid.
114. Seeid.
115. See, e.g., Wikle v. Country Life Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 151, 154 (9th Cir. 1970) (affirming
decision of bankruptcy referee who had declined jurisdiction of action commenced by trustee to quiet
title to certain realty when, prior to commencement of bankruptcy case, state court receiver had been
appointed for purposes of collecting rents, because receivership constituted sufficient act of control to
oust debtor from possession and control of rent and preclude attachment of summary jurisdiction; in
alternative, noting that even if referee had summary jurisdiction over rents it was not an abuse of its
discretion to decline to exercise this jurisdiction "[w]here the jurisdictional issue is close or where
complete relief could not have been awarded among the interested parties"). See also, for example, In
re Maidman, 466 F.Supp. 278, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), where the court affirmed that portion of
bankruptcy court's order deferring to state court construction of lease terms because bankruptcy court
did not have summary jurisdiction to dispossess lessee. The court noted, alternatively:
Even if [lessee's] motion for a certificate of contempt were deemed to be a sufficient invocation of
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to constitute consent to the exercise of summary jurisdiction,
the bankruptcy court "may, in the exercise of a proper discretion, decline to exercise (such
jurisdiction) if the best interests of the estate and of all interested parties would be better served by
permitting an issue to be litigated in a state court."
Id.(citations omitted).
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parties or some of the claims.' 16 Moreover, where the debtor enjoyed no

equity in property, it was often said that the court might exercise its
discretion and decline to exercise summary jurisdiction over the property
because 7 retaining jurisdiction provided no advantage for the bankruptcy

estate."

B. Bankruptcy Abstention Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code
1. Legislative History

In 1978, Congress enacted former 28 U.S.C. § 147 1(d), which permitted a
"district court or a bankruptcy court" to abstain "in the interest ofjustice."

18

Former section 1471(d) was enacted in 1978 as a small part of a larger
reform project: the expansion of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.
The 1978 provisions broadly conferred on federal district courts bankruptcy
jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy Code, or
arising in or related to a bankruptcy case." 9 The provisions eliminated the
summary/plenary distinction that previously governed the limited jurisdiction
of bankruptcy courts 120 and permitted untenured bankruptcy 2 courts to
'
exercise the entirety of this broad grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction.'
Legislative history 122 indicates that Congress was motivated, both in

116. See, e.g., United Merchants & Mfr., Inc. v. Union Bank (In re United Merchants & Mfr.,
Inc.), 3 B.R. 286 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that, although two of six defendants had consented
to exercise of summary jurisdiction by bankruptcy court, bankruptcy court should surrender
jurisdiction to California state court which would have jurisdiction over all claims against all
defendants).
117. See, e.g., In re Shulte United, 49 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1931) (upholding grant of petitioner's
request for leave to institute foreclosure proceedings in state court on grounds that debtor lacked equity
in property on which mortgage was to be foreclosed); In re Johnson, 127 F. 618 (D. Nev. 1904)
(viewing fact that there was no prospect of an equity for bankruptcy estate as controlling factor in
declining to exercise summary jurisdiction over foreclosure action).
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) (repealed 1984). Section 1471(d) provided in full:
Subsection (b) or (c)[confening broad grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction] does not prevent a district
court or a bankruptcy court, in the interest of justice, from abstaining from hearing a particular
proceeding arising under title I1 or arising in or related to a case under title 11. Such abstention, or
a decision not to abstain, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
Id.
119. 28U.S.C. § 1471 (b) (repealed 1984).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 46-49 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6007-10.
121. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (c) (repealed 1984).
122. By this reference to legislative history, I reveal that I do not count myself among the "New
Textualists." See William Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990). I count
myself in good company. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses ofLegislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice
Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation,76 MINN. L. REV. 1133 (1992); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOzO L. REV. 1597 (1991);
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expansively defining bankruptcy jurisdiction and in broadly delegating this
jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts, by an interest in expediting the
administration and resolution of bankruptcy cases:

A comprehensive grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts over
all controversies arising out of any bankruptcy or rehabilitation case

would greatly diminish the basis for litigation of jurisdictional issues
which consumes so much time, money, and energy of the bankruptcy

system 123and of those involved in the administration of debtors'
affairs.

By consolidating jurisdiction over all bankruptcy-related litigation in a single
bankruptcy forum, Congress evinced an understanding that the division of
jurisdiction among state courts and federal district and bankruptcy courts
slowed down the administration of bankruptcy cases and made the
bankruptcy process more expensive than necessary. In reducing these
adjudicative costs, Congress sought to enhance distributions to creditors from
bankruptcy estates.
In the midst of this broad expansion of bankruptcy jurisdiction, Congress
also enacted former section 1471(d), which authorized "a district court or a
bankruptcy court, in the interest of justice" to abstain "from hearing a
particular proceeding."' 124 The legislative history of former section 1471(d)
identifies two purposes for the provision. The House Report explains the

Eskridge, supra; Patricia Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1990);
George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability
of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources ofLegislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39;
Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380. But see, e.g., W. David
Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory InterpretationUnder the Rule ofLaiv, 44
STAN. L. REV. 383 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the CoordinatingFunction
of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of
LegislativeHistory, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371. Although Justice Antonin Scalia is probably the most famous
of these "New Textualists," the Supreme Court has rejected Justice Scalia's position that legislative
history is wholly irrelevant to statutory construction. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501
U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991). Notwithstanding this rejection, the Court may be less likely to rely on
legislative history to support its holding than it was a decade ago. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill,
Textualism and the Futureof the Chevron Doctrine,72 WASH U. L.Q. 351 (1994).
123. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 46 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6007. The House
Report states:
H.R 8200 grants the bankruptcy courts broad and complete jurisdiction over all matters and
proceedings that arise in connection with bankruptcy cases.... The forum shopping and
jurisdictional litigation that have plagued the bankruptcy system, the unfaimess to defendants from
'jurisdiction by ambush,' and the dissipation of assets and the expense associated with bifurcated
jurisdiction will be eliminated by the jurisdiction proposed by this bill.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 48-49 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6010.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) (repealed 1984).
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discretionary bankruptcy abstention provision as follows: "[I]n order to

insure that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is exercised only when
appropriate to the expeditious disposition of bankruptcy cases, the bill
codifies present case law relating to the power of abstention in particular
proceedings by the bankruptcy court.' ' 125 It went on to refer to this pre-Code
case law in the following terms: "The [discretionary abstention] subsection
recognizes the exigencies that arise in such cases as Thompson v. Magnolia

Petroleum, 309 U.S. 478 (1940), in which it is more appropriate to have a
State court hear a particular matter of State law."'126 The legislative history of
former section 1471(d), thus, articulates two distinct purposes for the
discretionary bankruptcy abstention provision. First, "to insure that the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is exercised only when appropriate to the
expeditious disposition of bankruptcy cases"; and, second, to "codiffy] ...
case law relating to the power
of abstention," citing Thompson v. Magnolia
127
particular.
in
Co.
Petroleum
2. Case Law InterpretingFormerSection 1471(d)
Because decisions under former section 1471(d) were not reviewable on
appeal, 28 there are no circuit or district court decisions interpreting this
provision. Bankruptcy courts generally construed this provision to codify the
12 9
Supreme Court's decision in Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.'

125. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 51(1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6012.
126. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 446 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6401.
127. 309 U.S. 478 (1940). Even if legislative history were ignored, it would be appropriate to
consider this pre-Code case law in construing the permissive bankruptcy abstention provision. The
Supreme Court has held that the Bankruptcy Code should be construed in a way that is consistent with
case law developed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 unless the statute on its face indicates an intent
to override this longstanding precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 537-38
(1996) (adopting principle of statutory construction that Congress is generally presumed, in
bankruptcy context, to have intended to codify pre-Code judicial doctrine, absent clear language to the
contrary in the statute); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
501 (1986) ("The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to
change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. The Court has
followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications."). Nothing
in the plain language of former section 1471(d) demonstrates an intent to override judicially-developed
abstention doctrines under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
128. See U.S.C. § 1471(d) (repealed 1984) (providing that decisions to abstain or not to abstain
under this provision are not appealable).
129. See, e.g., Ridgefield, Inc. v. Unity Foods, Inc. (In re Unity Foods, Inc.), 35 B.R. 876, 879
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) ("Section 1471(d) codifies Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S.
478 (1940), in which case the Supreme Court held that it is appropriate for a Bankruptcy Court to defer
to a state court where the issue involves an unsettled question of state law."); In re Desmarais, 33 B.R.
27, 28-29 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983) (same); Sugarman v. Rouse Construction, Inc. (In re Technical Indus.,
Inc.), 21 B.R. 863, 866 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (same); Chrystler v. Hesler (In re Hesler), 16 B.R1
329, 332 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981) (same); Kimrey v. Dorsett (In re Kimrey), 10 B.R. 466, 468
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Following Thompson, bankruptcy courts abstained under former section

1471(d) where the state law at issue was unsettled. 130 Also, they generally

declined to abstain from exercising their bankruptcy jurisdiction where the
state law at issue was not unsettled, 13' although notable exceptions to this
broad rule of thumb existed. For example, where the state law involved
peculiarly local interests, such as the state law governing real property, 32 or
divorce and other domestic relations, 133 bankruptcy courts abstained under
former section 1471(d), although the state law was settled. Moreover,
notwithstanding the unsettled or local character of the state law at issue in a
proceeding, bankruptcy courts also considered whether abstention would
promote or hinder their administration and resolution of the bankruptcy
case. 134 Further, after the Supreme Court found section 1471 to violate

(Bankr. M.D.N.C.) (same); In re Lafayette Radio Elec. Corp., 8 B.R 973, 975-76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1981) (same); Diego v. Zamost (In re Zamost), 7 B.R. 859, 862-63 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (same);
Young v. Sultan Ltd. (In re Lucasa Int'l Ltd.), 6 B.R. 717, 720 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same); Jewel
Terrace Corp. v. Kew Gardens Tenants League (In re Jewel Terrace Corp.), 3 B.R. 36, 38-39 (Bankr.
ED.N.Y. 1980) (same).
130. See, e.g., In re Kimrey, 10 B.R. at 468 (abstaining from proceeding brought by chapter 13
debtor against executor of debtor's father's estate to recover portion of funds in certificate of deposit
held by father at his death because rights of ownership in joint bank account with rights of
survivorship was unsettled issue of North Carolina law involving interpretation of ambiguous state
statute).
131. See, e.g., In re Unity Foods, Inc., 35 B.R. at 879 (declining to abstain under former section
1471(d) and noting that "this case simply requires the Bankruptcy Court to interpret the bargain
between the parties and to assess the damages for any breach thereof as is determined by the
application of well-settled state law"); In re Lafayette Radio Elec. Corp., 8 B.R. at 977 (declining to
abstain under former section 1471(d) because state law at issue in that proceeding was not sufficiently
unsettled); In re Zamost, 7 B.R. at 864 (declining to abstain under former section 147 1(d) because "the
state law questions do not appear to be so complicated, unclear, unsettled, or uniquely within the
province of the state courts in terms of state policy").
132. See, e.g., In re Desmarais, 33 B.R. 27, 29 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983) ("Real property rights are an
area of recognized state court expertise."); In re Jewel Terrace Corp., 3 B.R. at 39 (indicating that
where there are "issues involving state court expertise such as the landlord-tenant area, it is proper to
defer to the state court").
133. See, e.g., In re Kaplan, 18 B.R. 1018 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (abstaining from pending
divorce action in which nondebtor spouse had been awarded temporary maintenance and support,
custody of the children, exclusive occupancy of marital residence, and exclusive possession of family
automobile); In re Heslar, 16 B.R. 329, 332 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981) ("Divorce and domestic
relations are areas which have traditionally been left to the states.").
134. See, e.g., In re Unity Foods, Inc., 35 B.R. at 880 (noting that "there are no unusual or
exceptional circumstances, such as a pending action in state court"); In re Desmarais,33 B.R. at 29 (in
deciding to abstain and permit Maine court to rule on nature of debtor's interest in property, court
emphasized that state court "already has the foreclosure proceeding and the issue of the 'order of
priority' of the parties before it"); In re Zamost, 7 B.R. at 863-64 (noting that abstention would foster
interests in judicial economy and avoidance of multiplicity of suits in that court had exclusive
jurisdiction to decide whether this contract claim should be excepted from discharge); In re Lafayette
Radio Elec. Corp., 8 B.R. at 977 (noting that pending state court action had been dormant for three
years and had not progressed beyond discovery stage); Hawaii Mini-Storage Sys., Inc. v. McClellan
(In re Hawaii Mini-Storage Sys., Inc.), 4 B.R. 489 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1980) (noting pendancy of parallel
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Article I in 1982, but before congressional enactment of the 1984
jurisdictional provisions, some bankruptcy courts abstained under section
1471(d) from hearing state law "related to" proceedings, fearing
that the
35
exercise ofsuch jurisdiction might have been unconstitutional.1
C. Bankruptcy Abstention Under the 1984 Amendments
1. LegislativeHistory
Four years after enactment of the 1978 jurisdictional provisions, the
Supreme Court, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co.,' 3 6 held that the delegation of the broad grant of jurisdiction to
bankruptcy courts, whose judges enjoyed neither life tenure nor salary
protection, violated Article m1 of the Constitution. This decision caused
Congress to reconfigure the bankruptcy jurisdictional and procedural
provisions in 1984, including the permissive bankruptcy abstention
provision.
Unlike much of the 1984 legislation, which substantially altered the 1978
jurisdictional and procedural provisions to comply with the Supreme Court's
Northern Pipeline constitutional ruling, Congress largely restated the
permissive abstention provision from the former section 1471(d). 137 Because
few changes were made to the permissive abstention provision, and because
the 1984 provisions were rushed through Congress in a last-minute deal,
there is virtually no38legislative history to assist in discerning the meaning of
section 1334(c)(1).1
A Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee included the following
remarks on the permissive abstention provision:
Yet another significant change in the 1978 law-one which again
operates to give parties greater authority over the forum in which their
claims are be litigated-may be found in the abstention provisions in

state court action); In re Jewel Terrace, 3 B.R. at 40 (noting that if issue had been presented "without
the involvement of a court of original and competent jurisdiction, this court would have no hesitancy
in presiding over and deciding the issue giving due consideration to the applicable state and municipal

law").
135. See. e.g., In re Desmarais,33 B.RI at 29 (abstaining under former section 1471(d), in part,
due to court's "uncertain jurisdiction over proceedings involving purely state law issues after Northern
Pipeline Constr.Co. v. MarathonPipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)").
136. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
137. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) (repealed 1984), with 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1994).
138. For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1984 Amendments, see Susan Block-Lieb,
UsingLegislative Historyto InterpretBankruptcy Statutes, in BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AND STRATEGY
(Alan Resnick ed. 1987).
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subsection 1471(h). Abstention by Federal courts in the bankruptcy
area is not a new concept. Subsection 1471(d) of existing law provides
for a district court or a bankruptcy court, in the "interests ofjustice," to
abstain from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11.... S.1013 builds on this
existing abstention provision but gives it greater effect by amending it
to allow the district court to abstain, not only in the "interest of
"interest of comity with state courts and
justice," but also in the
39
respect for state law.'
Several individual senators also discussed the permissive abstention
provision on the floor of the Senate, but these remarks are not especially
illuminating. As Senator Thurmond, then Chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, described the proposal: 'Taragraph (1) of this section would
direct the district judge to abstain from hearing any claim or cause of action,
where this is in 'the interest of justice'-which is present law-or in 'the
14 0
interest or [sic] comity with State courts and respect for State law."
Senator Heflin, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, commented on
the permissive abstention provision in a similar vein:
Greater authority over the choice of forum is also given to the parties
by the abstention provisions of this legislation which amends the
existing abstention provision to allow the district court to abstain, not
only in the interest of justice, but also in the interest of comity with
State courts or respect for State law. 141
These comments indicate that construction of section 1334(c)(1), thus,
should be guided, in large part, by the legislative history of former section

1471(d). It also indicates that the standard for abstention under section
139. S. REP. NO. 98-55, at 17-18 (1983).
140. 130 CONG. REc. 9921 (1983) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). He also remarked:
Mhe abstention provisions of the 1978 act have been strengthened to allow a party who wishes to
have a related proceeding based purely on State law heard in State court to have access to that
forum.

Id. But in making the latter remarks he probably was referring to the mandatory abstention provision,
rather than the permissive one, since he naturally discussed both provisions together.
141. 130 CONG. REC. 9924 (1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin). Senator Heflin also stated:
The 1978 act significantly expanded the scope of Federal jurisdiction by empowering Federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims governed solely by State law, such as contract claims or
divorce, which do not meet the traditional requirements for Federal jurisdiction. This bill gives
increased respect for State courts and State laws by according greater opportunity for purely State
law issues to be adjudicated in State court
Id. However, the above remarks probably were made in reference to the mandatory, and not the
permissive, abstention proposal.
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1334(c)(1) was understood to be broader than that under former section
1471(d).
There is, on the other hand, much discussion of the mandatory abstention
provision, section 1334(c)(2), in the legislative history of the 1984
Amendments. 142 Because they are related provisions, the legislative history
of section 1334(c)(2) is useful in discerning congressional understanding of
section 1334(c)(1).
The House and Senate had, at the start, very different ideas of how the
bankruptcy court system should be restructured following the Supreme
Court's decision in Northern Pipeline.143 During the 97th and much of the
98th congressional sessions, the House Judiciary Committee backed an

Article I approach-that is, they would have reconfigured the bankruptcy
court system as "courts of the United States" with life tenure and salary
protection. 144 The Senate did not support the proposition of life-tenured
bankruptcy judges. Instead, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported Senate
Bill 1013,141 legislation that would have permitted non-Article III bankruptcy
courts "to exercise all of the" bankruptcy jurisdiction conferred on federal
district courts only if the proceeding was not "recalled" by the district
court.146 Under the Senate proposal, a recall of "any proceeding" would have
been permitted "in the discretion of the district court," but, if requested by
147
"any party," recall of a related to proceeding would have been required.

142. Section 1334(c)(2) requires district courts to abstain from their "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction over a state law claim if there is no independent ground for federal jurisdiction and a
parallel state court action can be timely adjudicated. For the complete text of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2),
see supra note 10.
143. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Resolution of the constitutional crisis created by the Northern Pipeline
decision was also stalled by an intense lobbying campaign mounted by special interest groups who
pressured Congress to combine a bankruptcy court bill with numerous other proposals, unrelated to the
constitutional problem. See H.R. REP. No. 98-9, at 3 (1983) ("Legislation to cure the constitutional
problem in the bankruptcy courts, however, became bogged down in the lameduck session of the 97th
Congress when various interest groups attempted to use it as a vehicle for changes in the substantive
bankruptcy law, unrelated to the constitutional problem at hand."); S. REP. No. 98-55, at 13 (1983)
("Due to a variety of factors, including a lack of consensus on how best to resolve the Marathon issue,
controversy over whether legislation should also address substantive bankruptcy reforms, and the press
of other major legislative items on the Senate floor, no action was taken to restructure the bankrutpey
courts during the 97th Congress.'); see also Block-Lieb, supranote 138, at 2-11.
144. See H.R. REP. No. 98-9 (1983) (reporting favorably on House Bill 3, providing for the
appointment of United States bankruptcy judges under Article I of the Constitution); H.R. REP. No.
97-807 (1982) (reporting favorably on House Bill 6978, providing for the appointment of United
States bankruptcy judges under Article III of the Constitution).
145. See S. REP. No. 98-55 (1983).
146. S. 1013,98th Cong. § 102 (1983) (defining proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c)).
147. In addition, the proceeding would have mandated recall "where the district court determines
that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both [the Bankruptcy Code] and other laws
of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce." S. 1013,
§ 102 (defining proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e)(2)(B)).
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The Senate proposal also would have established broad grounds for
abstention from bankruptcy jurisdiction. In one proposed provision, district
courts would have been permitted to abstain "in the interest of justice, or in
the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law."' 148 Another
would have required district courts to abstain from hearing "a proceeding
involving the debtor which is based upon a State law claim or cause of action
not arising under [the Bankruptcy Code] or arising in a [bankruptcy] case" if
it "could not otherwise have been brought in Federal court" absent the grant
of bankruptcy jurisdiction, and if "an action to adjudicate such claim has
been or will be timely 49instituted and prosecuted in a State forum of
appropriate jurisdiction."'
This impasse was broken as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco. 50 Within hours after that decision had been
issued, Representative Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
introduced legislation in reaction to Bildisco.'5 t A month later, Chairman
Rodino and other members of the House Judiciary Committee introduced an
omnibus bill (House Bill 5174) containing provisions relating to the rejection
of collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy cases in reaction to
Bildisco, as well as provisions relating to bankruptcy jurisdiction and
procedure, consumer bankruptcies, and grain elevator facility
bankruptcies. 52 Within days of its introduction, the House debated and
passed this bill under a modified closed rule that allowed consideration of
one designated amendment-an amendment striking out the proposed Article
III bankruptcy court provisions, and substituting the non-Article III
bankruptcy court provisions that had been introduced by Representatives
Kastenmeir and Kindness.153 Following lengthy debate on the propriety of
the closed rule, House Bill 5174, amended to include the Kindness-

148. Id. (defining proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1471(h)(1)).
149. Id. (defining proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1471(h)(2)). The proposed mandatory bankruptcy
abstention provision also provided "[t]hat this paragraph shall be construed to limit the applicability of
the stay provided for by [II U.S.C. § 362] only to the extent necessary to permit adjudication but not
the execution of such claim by the State forum." Id. It also would have required that a motion to
abstain "be filed within ten days of the granting of a petition to recall." Id.
150. 465 U.S. 513 (1984). In Bildisco, the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts could
authorize the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement upon the showing by a reorganizing
debtor-in-possession or chapter 11 trustee that the agreement burdened the estate and that a balance of
the equities favored rejection of the contract. Organized labor viewed the overrule of the Bildisco
decision as an important priority in the 98th Congress.
151. See 130 CONG. REC. 2989, 3020 (1984) (introducing House Bill 4908); see also Block-Lieb,
supranote 138, at 2-23.
152. See 130 CONG. REC. 5857-59, 5860 (1984); see also Block-Lieb, supranote 138, at 2-23.
153. See Block-Lieb, supra note 138, at 2-24.
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Kastenmeier proposal, passed the House by a wide margin. 154 Two months
thus,
later, the Senate adopted an amended version of House Bill 5174,
55
readying the Senate and House versions of the bill for conference.1
In debating enactment of the amended House Bill 5174, Senator
Thurmond, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, explained that "title I of

this substitute amendment contains basically the provisions of the
Kastenmeier-Kindness amendment with several changes."' 56 One of the

"more significant changes" that the Senate made to House Bill 5174 was its
"retention of the Senate provision regarding mandatory abstention," on the
grounds that the House version was rejected as "somewhat more limited than
the Senate provision."' 57 Several important senators had grave misgivings as
to the breadth of the Senate mandatory abstention provision, viewing it as
needlessly disruptive of the expeditious administration of a bankruptcy
on the issue,
estate. 158 However, rather than seek a separate vote in the Senate
15
they agreed to await debate in the Conference Committee. 1
In the conference, the Senate acceded to the House's narrower mandatory
abstention provision. 60 Senator Dole described the compromise on the
mandatory abstention provision:

As most of my colleagues are aware, the Senate conferees differed
over whether to retain the abstention language found in the original

154. For debates during consideration and passage of House Bill 5174, as amended, see 130
CONG. REc. 6237-49 (1984).
155. See 130 CONG. REC. 17,158 (1984); see also Block-Lieb, supra note 138,2-24 to 2-28.
156. 130 CONG. REC. 13,059 (1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
157. Id. For the remarks of other Senators in support of a broader mandatory abstention provision,
see 130 CONG. REc. 13,065-71 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 130 CoNG. REC. 17,152 (1984)
(statement of Sen. Heflin); 130 CONG. REc. 17,156-57 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
158. See 130 CONG. REC. 13,076 (1984) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (commenting that, under
broad mandatory abstention provision, "creditors and debtors alike would be deprived of the speedy
resolution of disputes that is essential to the operation of bankruptcy"); 130 CONG. REc. 17,153 (1984)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) (suggesting that broad mandatory abstention provision "would add
expense and delay to a process that requires speed and limits on needless expenditures"); 130 CONG.
REC. 17,157 (1984) (statement of Sen. Dole) (opining that broad mandatory abstention provision
"would, I believe, have the effect of fragmenting jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts to an extent that
would seriously impair the efficiency of those courts and dramatically harm the interests of creditors in
need of quick adjudication of their claims').
159. See 130 CONG. REc. 13,075-77 (1984) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (considering proposing
amendment to Senate version of House Bill 5174 that, among other things, would have narrowed
grounds for mandatory abstention); 130 CONG. REC. 17,153 (1984) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)
(deciding against offering amendment, despite support of Sen. Dole, in order to expedite passage and
consideration by conference committee); 130 CONG. REC. 17,157 (1984) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(indicating support for DeConcini amendment, and willingness to accede to passage of bill without
consideration of amendment to facilitate its consideration by conferees).
160. See 130 CONG. REc. 20,081 (1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ("The mandatory
abstention provisions of the House bill are included in the bill.').
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Senate bill. The majority of Senate conferees-this Senator
included-felt that the Senate language was too broad, in that it
prohibited the bankruptcy courts or district courts from considering
any case that was based upon a State law claim. Mandatory abstention
in favor of State courts in those cases was required. The House
provision on abstention was, however, limited to Marathon type
proceedings and the party seeking abstention would have been
required to show that the cause could be timely adjudicated in the
State courts before abstention would have been required.
The Senate conferees reached a fair compromise on this issue. The
result of the conference discussion was a provision that preserves the
integrity of bankruptcy jurisdiction while allowing abstention for
personal injury cases where they can be timely adjudicated in State
courts. In addition, where abstention does not occur, those cases will
court... or, if that court finds it appropriate,
be handled by the district
16 1
where the claim arose.
Representative Kastenmeier similarly remarked on the terms of this
compromise:
I am pleased that we were able to fashion a constitutional, workable
bankruptcy court system....
The House-passed bill provided that there should be mandatory
abstention in a narrow range of cases involving Marathon-type
litigation. The House abstention provisions also have been
retained.... The change in the definition in the Senate-passed bill
would have contradicted the basic purposes of the consolidated
jurisdiction we adopted in 1978 in response to the recommendations
of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws. Finally, it would have
dissipated the assets of the estate by creating a multiplicity of forums
for the adjudication of parts of a bankruptcy case.
on the
The conference report largely rejects the Senate limitations
162
tasks which are to be performed by a bankruptcy judge.
Thus, when Congress adopted the mandatory bankruptcy abstention
provision in 1984, it generally intended to reconstitute the bankruptcy court
system as both constitutional and capable of fulfilling the efficient resolution
of bankruptcy cases.' 63 The fragmentation of bankruptcy jurisdiction among

161. 130 CONG. REC. 20,083 (1984) (statement of Sen. Dole).
162, 130 CONG. REC. 20,227-28 (1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
163. In describing Congress's intentions regarding the mandatory abstention provision, and more
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district courts, bankruptcy courts and state courts conflicts with the

bankruptcy goal of expeditious administration. Therefore, Congress sought to
divide bankruptcy jurisdiction among these courts only as much as the
Constitution required. This general purpose should also govern interpretation
of the companion permissive bankruptcy abstention provision.
2. Case Law ConstruingSection 1334(c)(1)
Courts of appeals are divided in their construction of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334(c)(1). Some conclude it codifies judicially-created abstention

doctrines.' 64 For example, in Coker v. Pan American World Airways, the
Second Circuit construed section 1334(c)(1) as "intended to codify the
judicial abstention doctrines."' 65 However, several courts of appeals have
explicitly rejected this approach, viewing section 1334(c)(1) as statutorily
overriding these judge-made doctrines. 66 For example, the Ninth Circuit, in

generally its purposes in reconstituting the bankruptcy jurisdictional provision, legislative history does
not conflict with the language of the statute. Although the circumstances leave only the remarks of
individual legislators to rely on, it is the confluence of four or five important members who have been
quoted above. Moreover, even in the absence of these legislative remarks, it would be appropriate to
infer that the statutory scheme sought constitutional consistency with the bankruptcy goal of
expeditiousness.
164. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Dow Chem. Corp. (In re Dow Coming Corp.), 113 F.3d 565 (6th Cir.
1997) (citing Pan American with approval); In re United States Brass Corp., 110 F.3d 1261 (7th Cir.
1997) (citing Pan American with approval); In re Joint E. and S.Dist. Asbestos Litg., 78 F.3d 764, 775
(2d Cir. 1996) (noting that district court has "little or no discretion to abstain in a [bankruptcy-related]
case which does not meet traditional abstention requirements"); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pac. R.R. Co., 6 F.3d 1184, 1189 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that "discretionary abstention under
section 1334(c)(1) is 'informed by principles developed under the judicial abstention doctrines, and
courts have usually looked to these well-developed notions of judicial abstention when applying
section 1334(c)(1).') (citing and quoting Pan American); Coker v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re Pan
Am. Corp.), 950 F.2d 839, 846 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that Congress "intended that section 1334(c)(1)
be informed by principles developed under the judicial abstention doctrines"). Without discussing
section 1334(c)(1) at length, several other courts of appeals have relied on judicially-created abstention
doctrines to affirm district court decisions to abstain. See Duell v. Utah (In re Duell), No. 95-16672,
1996 WL 32142 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 1996) (relying on domestic relations exception and Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992), to affirm district court's abstention from making paternity
determination in context of dischargeability hearing); Wilson v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 8
F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 1993) (relying on Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), to uphold district
court's decision to abstain from determining retroactive application of decision of Louisiana Supreme
Court regarding constitutionality of exemption of rural electric cooperative from regulation by state
public service commission); Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying domestic
relations exception to bankruptcy jurisdiction in affirming district court's decision to abstain from
determining whether contempt proceeding before domestic relations court was violative of automatic
stay).
165. In re Pan Am. Corp., 950 F.2d at 845.
166. See Eastport Assoc. v. City of Los Angeles (In re Eastport Assoc.), 935 F.2d 1071, 1079 &
n.7 (9th Cir. 1991). There, the Ninth Circuit rejected an argument that the district court should have
abstained under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), or Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Cio
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EastportAssociates v. City of Los Angeles, rejected arguments made under

the Burford and Thibideaux abstention doctrines, concluding that "[s]ection
1334(c)(1) encompasses the bases for all the judicially-created abstention
doctrines.' 67 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit, in Mathiasen's Tanker
Industries, Inc. v. Apex Oil Co., reasoned that it was "obliged to take the
statute at its word,',168 and read the statute to create two separate grounds for

abstention stated in the disjunctive. 69 The Eighth Circuit interpreted section
1334(c)(1) literally to permit abstention "in the interest ofjustice," regardless
of the source of law, and thus affirmed a decision of the district court to
abstain from hearing personal injury tort claims brought, not under state law,
but under the Jones Act and federal maritime law.
In numerous other decisions, courts of appeals implicitly reject the view
that section 1334(c)(1) codifies pre-Code abstention doctrines by applying a
multifactor test for discretionary bankruptcy abstention-a test in which few
of its many factors find parallel in nonbankruptcy abstention case law. 70 The
of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), because section 1334(c)(1) overrides these judicial abstention
doctrines:
Section 1334(c)(1) encompasses the bases for all the judicially created abstention doctrines: an
interest in justice or comity or respect for state law. If the district court did not abuse its discretion
in declining to abstain under the statute, it must not have abused its discretion in declining to
abstain under the narrower Burford andLouisianaPowerdoctrines.
In re EastportAssoc., 935 F.2d at 1079 n.7; see also Mathiasen's Tanker Indus., Inc. v. Apex Oil Co.
(In re Apex Oil Co.), 980 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1992) (explicitly declining to follow Pan American,
reasoning that only the portion of section 1334(c)(1) that permits district courts to abstain "in the
interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law" codifies pre-Code abstention doctrines).
167. In reEastportAssoc.,935 F.2d at 1079 n.7.
168. 980F.2dat 1153.
169. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (permitting abstention "in the interest of justice, or in the interest
of comity with State courts or respect for State law" (emphasis added)).
170. See, e.g., In re Tucson Estates, Inc., 912 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth
twelve-factor test for discretionary bankruptcy abstention from In re Republic Reader's Service, Inc.,
81 B.t 422,429 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987)); Siragusa v. Siragusa (In re Siragusa), 27 F.3d 406 (9th Cir.
1994) (applying twelve-factor test set forth in Tucson Estates and upholding bankruptcy court decision
to abstain from complaint alleging that modification by Nevada domestic relations court of debtor's
alimony obligations violated postdischarge injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 524); In re Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 6 F.3d 1184, 1189 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Tucson Estates in
reversing determination to abstain, and stating that "[c]ourts should apply these factors flexibly, for
their relevance and importance will vary with the particular circumstances of each case, and no one
factor is necessarily determinative"); In re L & S Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing
Tucson Estates with approval in affirming bankruptcy court decision to abstain from enjoining
defendants' pursuit of their defenses and counterclaims in pending state court action that had been
initiated by the debtor prepetition); In re Eastport Assoc., 935 F.2d at 1075-78 (applying Tucson
Esates in affirming district court's denial of request to abstain from declaratory judgment action
brought in bankruptcy court by debtor-in-possession). Without citing Tucson Estates, other courts of
appeals have also applied a multifactor policy approach to discretionary bankruptcy abstention. See,
eg., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Titan Energy, Inc. (In re Titan Energy, Inc.), 837 F.2d 325 (8th
Cir. 1988) (upholding bankruptcy court abstention from declaratory action by applying multifactor test
that emphasized, among other things, that state law issues would predominate in the declaratory action,
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most influential of these is the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Tucson
Estates. 71 1 There, the court set forth twelve factors to be balanced when
deciding whether to abstain from an exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction:
(1) the effect or lack thereof on the efficient administration of the
estate if a Court recommends abstention, (2) the extent to which state
law issues predominate over bankruptcy issues, (3) the difficulty or
unsettled nature of the applicable law, (4) the presence of a related
proceeding commenced in state court or other nonbankruptcy court,
(5) the jurisdictional basis, if any, other than 28 U.S.C. § 1334, (6) the
degree of relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to the main
bankruptcy case, (7) the substance rather than form of an asserted
'core' proceeding, (8) the feasibility of severing state law claims from
core bankruptcy matters to allow judgments to be entered in state
court with enforcement left to the bankruptcy court, (9) the burden of
[the bankruptcy court's] docket, (10) the likelihood that the
commencement of the proceeding in bankruptcy court involves forum
shopping by one of the parties, (11) the existence of a right to a 1jury
72
trial, and (12) the presence in the proceeding of nondebtor parties.
Only the third factor--"the difficulty or unsettled nature of the applicable
law"--bears resemblance to factors considered in abstention determinations
made outside the context of bankruptcy. Moreover, because this balancing
approach views unsettled issues of state law as only one of many relevant
factors for a court to consider in determining whether to abstain from
bankruptcy jurisdiction, this approach leaves open the possibility of
abstention from state law issues whose resolution is straightforward.' 73 In this

that the dispute could be timely adjudicated in state court, and that the declaratory action was only
peripherally related to the debtor's chapter 7 case); Citibank, N.A. v. White Motor Corp. (In re White
Motor Credit), 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985) (adopting policy-oriented factor approach to review
district court's decision to abstain from exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction over hundreds of tort
actions pending in state court against debtor-in-possession).
171. 912F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir 1990).
172. Id. The court in Tucson Estates relied on an earlier decision of a Texas bankruptcy court for
this twelve-factor test. See Republic Reader's Serv., Inc. v. Maspazhe Serv. Bureau, Inc. (In re
Republic Reader's Serv., Ihc.), 81 B.Rt 422,429 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987).
173. See In re Williams, 144 F.3d 544, 550 n.4 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding bankruptcy court's
modification of automatic stay to permit housing authority to continue forcible entry action against
debtor, and indicating in dicta that court might have abstained from determination of right to
possession although not describing state landlord/tenant law as unsettled); In re Siragusa, 27 F.3d 406,

408 (9th Cir.'1994) (affirming abstention order although state law concerning modification of alimony
awards was neither unusually difficult nor unsettled); In re L & S Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 929, 935 (7th
Cir. 1993) (affirming abstention from request to enjoin pursuit of state contract defenses and
counterclaims in pending state court action although state law was not unsettled); In re White Motor
Credit, 761 F.2d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming abstention from bankruptcy court resolution of
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regard, the Tucson Estates twelve-factor
test deviates from most
174
nonbankruptcy abstention doctrines.
Despite this substantial disagreement on the construction of section
1334(c)(1), there are important issues on which courts of appeals agree. They
agree that bankruptcy courts are frequently justified in abstaining from
domestic relations issues, such as divorce, alimony, child support and the
like.17 5 Without discussion of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Wilton
v. Seven Falls Co., 176 they have deferred to the discretion of the lower court
when reviewing requests to stay declaratory judgment actions brought in the
bankruptcy court pending resolution of parallel state court actions. 77 With
the exception of Apex Oil, 178 courts of appeals agree that section 1334(c)(1)

does not justify abstention from proceedings involving only federal
questions.

79

Most importantly, they agree that the presence of unsettled

personal injury and wrongful death tort claims that were also pending in parallel state court actions
without discussion of unsettled nature of state tort law). But see Lindsey v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re
Dow Coming Corp.), 113 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 1997) (reversing district court's "global" abstention order
because district court failed to articulate what isues of unsettled state law existed in each pending tort
action).
174. Unsettled issues of state law are not requisite to a nonbankruptcy abstention determination.
For example, Burford abstention may be appropriate where state law involves peculiarly local issues,
such as domestic relations, state taxation or criminal law. Moreover, Colorado River abstention also
does not depend upon. a showing of unsettled state law issues. Nonetheless, unsettled issues of state
law are commonly present in federal abstention decisions, such as where the Pullman and Burford
abstention doctrines apply.
175. See, e.g., Duell v. Utah (Inre Duell), No. 95-16672, 1996 WL 32142 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 1996)
(affirming district court's abstention from making paternity determination in related dischargability
hearing); Siragusa v. Siragusa (In re Siragusa), 27 F.3d 406 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming decision to
abstain in favor of state domestic relations court determination as to whether modification of alimony
award was violative of postdischarge injunction); Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573 (1Ith Cir. 1992)
(affirming district court's decision holding that bankruptcy court should have abstained from domestic
relations decision.).
176. 515 U.S. 277 (1995) (adopting broad abstention standard to affirm district court's decision to
stay federal declaratory judgment action during pendency of parallel state court action).
177. See, e.g., In re United States Brass Corp., 110 F.3d 1261 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming lower
court's decision to abstain from declaratory judgement actions removed to bankruptcy court); Eastport
Assoc. v. City of Los Angeles (In re Eastport Assoc.), 935 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming district
court's denial of request to abstain from declaratory judgment action brought in bankruptcy court);
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Titan Energy, Inc. (In re Titan Energy, Inc.), 837 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.
1988) (affirming district court's decision to stay declaratory judgment action in bankruptcy court
pending resolution of direct action on related issues brought in state court).
178. 980 F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1992).
179. See In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 6 F.3d 1184, 1190-91 (7th Cir. 1993)
(reversing determination to abstain because it disagreed that resolution of issue of state law was
necessary to bankruptcy determination before district court); Coker v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re
Pan Am. Corp.), 950 F.2d 839 (2d. Cir. 1991) (concluding that bankruptcy abstention was not
warranted where determinative issue involved federal law regarding "whether the Warsaw Convention
preempts the Coker plaintiffs' state law causes of action" since "supremacy clause questions are
'essentially one of federal policy').
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issues of state law is
not determinative of a request for discretionary
18 0
bankruptcy abstention.
III. CODIFICATION OF ABSTENION DOCTRINES IN BANKRUPTCY
Courts of appeals are divided as to whether the permissive bankruptcy
abstention provision should be construed to incorporate or to override the
judicially created abstention doctrines. Neither construction is
unambiguously supported by the language of these statutory provisions.
From one perspective, the breadth of the statutory standard for
discretionary bankruptcy abstention, triggered by a balance of interests in
"justice" and "comity," refers to the judge-made standards for abstention.
Although the statutory language of both former section 1471(d) and current
section 1334(c)(1) is broad, the case law defining the nonbankruptcy
abstention doctrines also defies simple paraphrase. Moreover, it is generally
assumed that "[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled
meaning under ...the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute
otherwise dictates, that18Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning of these terms." '
The primary difficulty with this construction is that it assumes that
Congress did not expand upon the discretionary bankruptcy abstention
provision in 1984. During the short life of former section 1471(d), courts
understood this provision to codify pre-Code case law governing abstention
from bankruptcy jurisdiction, rather than a blank check to abstain from
bankruptcy jurisdiction whenever they pleased.182 Thus, if Congress intended
to codify abstention decisions when it permitted abstention "in the interest of
justice" under former section 1471(d), it is difficult to argue that Congress
meant to codify the same thing when it enacted section 1334(c)(1) permitting
abstention "in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State
courts or respect for State law." Generally, every word in a statute is assumed
to have meaning. 183 However, if Congress intended to codify judiciallycreated abstention doctrines with its enactment of former section 1471(d)-

180. See In re L & S Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1993) (indicating that "the presence
of a state law issue is not enough to warrant permissive abstention," but nonetheless characterizing this
factor as "a significant consideration," particularly when coupled with a finding that the plaintiff was
forum shopping); In re EastportAssoc., 935 F.2d at 1078 (noting that "[w]hile the presence of state
law issues is not dispositive, it should weigh heavily in the balance").
181. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1991), quoted in Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59,
69(1995).

182. For a discussion of this case law, see supra text accompanying notes 128-35.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35 (1992) (" [A] statute must, if
possible, be construed in such a fashion that every word has some operative effect.").
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doctrines which justify abstention from federal jurisdiction on comity
grounds-then it is hard to imagine that Congress intended section
1334(c)(1) to recodify the former bankruptcy abstention provision but with
an added emphasis on interests in "comity with State courts or respect for
State law."
Although the language of these abstention provisions may be ambiguous,
legislative history also supports a construction that views these statutes as
incorporating the judicially-created abstention doctrines. The legislative
history of former section 1471(d) indicates that Congress understood it to
"codif[y] present case law relating to the power of abstention in particular
proceedings by the banlcruptcy court."' 1 4 Similarly, the legislative history of
current section 1334(c)(1) generally views this provision as restating the
"present law.'185 But which of the case law discussed above did Congress
understand section 1334(c)(1) to codify?
A. NonbankruptcyAbstention Doctrines
When legislative history explains that the permissive bankruptcy
abstention provision "codifies present case law,'' 186 it could be understood to
incorporate the abstention doctrines applied generally in federal district
courts, the Pullman, Burford and Colorado River abstention doctrines
discussed above. Courts of appeals are divided on whether the discretionary
bankruptcy abstention provision codifies or overrides these nonbankruptcy
abstention doctrines, however.' 87 The Second Circuit views section
1334(c)(1) as a codification of the nonbankruptcy abstention doctrines,
leaving a district court "little or no discretion to abstain in a [bankruptcy88
related] case which does not meet traditional abstention requirements."'
The Ninth Circuit instead interprets section 1334(c)(1) to override the
nonbankruptcy abstention doctrines because it "encompasses the bases for all
the judically created abstention doctrines.' 189 Both lines of decision may read
this statute too narrowly.

184. H.I. REP. No. 95-595, at 51 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6012.
185. 130 CONG. REc. 9922 (1983) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
186. See supranotes 184-85.
187. Compare, e.g., Coker v. Pan Am.World Airways (In re Pan Am. Corp.), 950 F.2d 839, 845
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that section 1334(c)(1) "was intended to codify judicial abstention doctrines"),
with, e.g., Eastport Assoc. v. City of Los Angeles (In re Eastport Assoc.), 935 F.2d 1071, 1079 & n.7
(9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting argument that district court should have abstained under Burford or
Thibodaux since it viewed section 1334(c)(1) as overriding these judicial abstention doctrines).
188. In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 78 F.3d 764, 775 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Bethphage Lutheran Serv., Inc. v. Weicker, 965 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (2d Cir. 1992)).
189. In re EastportAssoc., 935 F.2d at 1079 n.7.
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Contrary to the suggestion of the Ninth Circuit, section 1334(c)(1) should
not be read as a refusal to incorporate these nonbankruptcy abstention
doctrines into bankruptcy practice. Nothing on the face of this statute
indicates an intent to supplant the nonbankruptcy abstention doctrines. If
anything, the language of section 1334(c)(1) appears to incorporate this case

law with its reference to interests in comity and judicial economy. Moreover,
under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, courts applied these doctrines to
permit abstention from bankruptcy jurisdiction. 190 In the absence of clear
statutory language to the contrary, the Bankruptcy Code is generally
construed to incorporate pre-Code case law. 191 Also, both the statutory
language of this provision and its legislative history support, rather than
refute, incorporation of these judicial abstention doctrines with enactment of
the permissive bankruptcy abstention provision.
Reference to other statutory provisions, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2),
the mandatory bankruptcy abstention provision, 192 and 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)(1), (2), (4), the "criminal,' 193 "domestic relations,"' 194 and "police
and regulatory" enforcement proceeding' 95 exceptions to the automatic stay,

190. See, e.g., Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 142 n.1 1 (1949) (dictum); Order of Ry.
Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 567 (1946) (same); Keidan v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. (In re
Mohammed), 327 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1964) (declining to abstain); California Oil Co. v. Huffstutler,
322 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying Burford abstention); In re Central Ry., 163 F.2d 44 (3d Cir.
1947) (same).
191. See supra note 127.
192. See supra note 10 (citing and quoting section 1334(c)(2)).
193. Section 362 (b)(1) of title 11 excepts from the reach of the automatic stay all criminal
proceedings against the debtor, thus, limiting the need to consider whether Younger v. Harrisprevents
a federal bankruptcy court from enjoining a state criminal proceeding. But see, e.g., Brinkman v. City
of Edina (In re Brinkman), 123 B.Rt 318, 322 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (applying "principal motivation
test" to attempt to determine whether prosecution was intended to "vindicate public good" or "to
collect the debt for one of its residents" in deciding whether Younger v. Harris precluded it from
entering discretionary stay of criminal action seeking restitution of debtor's bounced check).
194. Subsection (b)(2) excepts from the stay prosecution of certain domestic relations actions, and
the collection of certain marital claims against property that is not property of the estate, again limiting
the need to consider whether the domestic relations exception limits bankruptcy jurisdiction to the
same extent as it does other grants of federal jurisdiction. The domestic relations exception to the
automatic stay was substantially expanded with a 1994 amendment to this provision. See Pub. L. No,
103-394, 108 Stat. 4106, § 304 (expanding protections for child support and alimony claims in
bankruptcy). Prior to this amendment, nondebtor spouses frequently sought and obtained relief from
the automatic stay in order to commence or continue domestic relations actions against the debtor in
state court that exceeded the scope of this exception. See, e.g., Chunn v. Chunn (In re Chunn), 106
F.3d 1239 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming bankruptcy court's determination to lift automatic stay to permit
enforcement of temporary support award); White v. White (In re White), 851 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1988)
(affirming decision to lift automatic stay to permit state court divorce action to continue against
debtor); MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 755 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding
decision to lift automatic stay to permit nondebtor spouse to seek modification of spousal support
order in state court).
195. Section 362(b)(4) excepts from the automatic stay proceedings brought by a governmental
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also support the view that the nonbankruptcy abstention doctrines apply in a
bankruptcy context. The mandatory bankruptcy abstention provision, section
1334(c)(2), substantially overlaps with the Colorado River abstention
doctrine,' 96 but has not been read to preclude discretionary abstention where
some but not all of its elements exist. Several courts have construed section
1334(c)(1) to permit abstention when some but not all of the elements of the
mandatory abstention provision have been established. 197 Perhaps this result
is best understood as an application of the Colorado River doctrine in a
bankruptcy context. Similarly, the criminal, domestic relations and police and
regulatory enforcement proceeding exceptions to the automatic stay may
incorporate both Younger v. Harris and Burford abstention, 198 but have not
been interpreted to preclude either stay relief or abstention on these grounds
where the exemption has not been satisfied. 99
The Second Circuit contends that section 1334(c)(1) does no more than
codify the nonbankruptcy abstention doctrines, but surely it also reads this
statute too narrowly. Although the broad language of this statute contains

unit against the debtor to enforce its "police or regulatory power," streamlining Burfordanalysis in the
bankruptcy context. See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d
Cir. 1984) (concluding that state environmental regulatory actions were excepted from scope of
automatic stay under (b)(4) and (b)(5)).
196. A balance of the factors identified in Colorado River often would tip against an abstention
from bankruptcy jurisdiction. First, subject to constitutional limitations, there is an important federal
interest in the expeditious adjudication of all bankruptcy-related litigation in a single, bankruptcy
forum, regardless of whether state or federal law is implicated in this litigation. In addition, due to the
automatic stay of virtually all litigation pending in state courts at the time of the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy, there is little possibility of conflicts in the concurrent exercise of state and federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction. Where the parallel state and federal bankruptcy-related litigation involving
only issues of state law are pending between nondebtor third parties, and the state court action is close
to trial, abstention under the ColoradoRiver doctrine may be appropriate, but section 1334(c)(2) may
require abstention anyway.
197. See, e.g., Balcor/Morrisstown Ltd. Partnership v. Vector Whippany Assoc., 181 B.R. 781
(D.N.J. 1995).
198. Where resolution of unsettled issues of state law would obviate the need to reach federal
constitutional questions raised in a bankrutpcy context, Pullman should justify abstention from these
proceedings under the discretionary bankruptcy abstention provision. Pullman abstention has occurred
in only a handful of bankruptcy cases, however, and for good reason. Not only are constitutional issues
raised infrequently in a commercial setting, but, when they are raised, bankruptcy jurisdiction may not
extend to their resolution. This is because arising under jurisdiction in bankruptcy, although a form of
federal question jurisdiction, is far narrower than the federal question jurisdiction set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331-arising under jurisdiction extends only to proceedings determined by reference to the federal
Bankruptcy Code, and does not extend to proceedings arising under the Constitution or under other
sources of federal law. If bankruptcy jurisdiction covers these constitutional questions, then, it is
because they relate to the federal bankruptcy case; given the limited authority of a bankruptcy judge to
determine a related to proceeding, however, the plaintiff might instead ask the district court to
withdraw its reference of such a proceeding "for cause." See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1994).
199. See supra notes 193-95 (discussing instances in which relief from automatic stay was
granted, although exception from stay inapplicable).
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apparent references to these nonbankrutpcy abstention doctrines, it does not
appear to override pre-Code case law, such as Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co.,200 which previously developed distinct grounds for abstention
from bankruptcy jurisdiction. Indeed, the legislative history explicitly refers
to Thompson in describing the breadth of former section 1471(d). 2"' Most
importantly, a construction of section 1334(c)(1) that equates the standard for

discretionary bankruptcy abstention with that found in the nonbankruptcy
abstention doctrines ignores the distinctions between bankruptcy jurisdiction
and other grants of federal jurisdiction.
B. Pre-CodeBankruptcy Abstention Doctrines
The legislative history expressly refers to Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co.202 in its brief discussion of the permissive bankruptcy

abstention provision.203 But does this reference generally indicate
congressional understanding that abstention from bankruptcy jurisdiction
triggers policy considerations distinct from those supporting abstention from
other grants of federal jurisdiction? Or does it more pointedly indicate
congressional understanding that the bankruptcy abstention statute would
codify Thompson? Although the Bankruptcy Code often has been interpreted
to incorporate pre-Code case law absent clear indicia to the contrary,204 the

permissive bankruptcy abstention provision should not be viewed as limited
to the holding of Thompson. Even if it were appropriate to presume that
Congress was familiar with Thompson, and its narrow interpretation-a

proposition with which reasonable people might easily disagree 2 -it may
200. 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
201. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 446 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5962, 6401.
202. 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
203. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 446 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5962,6401.
204. See supranote 127.
205. Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989), decried
a process of statutory construction that views references to case law in legislative history as indicative
of Congress's intended meaning of that statute:
Congress is elected to enact statutes rather than point to cases, and its Members have better uses
for their time than poring over District Court opinions. That the Court should refer to the citation
of three District court cases in a document issued by a single committee of a single house as the
action of Congress displays the level of unreality that our unrestrained use of legislative history
has attained. I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members of Congress read either
one of the Committee Reports in question, even if(as is not always the case) the Reports happened
to have been published before the vote; that very few of those who did read them set off for the
nearest law library to check out what was actually said in the four cases at issue (or in the more
than 50 other cases cited by the House and Senate Reports); and that no Member of Congress
came to the judgment that the District Court cases would trump Johnson on the point at issue here
because the latter was dictum. As anyone familiar with modem-day drafting of congressional
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be particularly inappropriate to infer anything like that here. Not only was the

scope of Thompson unclear under the former Bankrutcy Act of 1898, but the
abolition of summary bankruptcy jurisdiction may substantially limit
Thompson's significance. 0 6
At its narrowest, Thompson would permit federal courts to abstain only if
state court resolution of unsettled issues of state law would obviate the
exercise of summary bankruptcy jurisdiction. But because bankruptcy
jurisdiction has expanded beyond its in rem roots, this would hardly ever
happen under the current law. Bankruptcy jurisdiction is now defined
expansively to include all proceedings "arising under" the Bankruptcy Code,

or "arising in" or "related to" a bankrutpcy case.207 Only rarely would the
resolution of unsettled state law issues render an exercise of bankruptcy

jurisdiction unnecessary, because "related to" jurisdiction extends to
proceedings that do not involve property of the estate but that otherwise

might affect administration of the bankruptcy estate.208 Alternatively,
Thompson can be construed, as it was in Mangus v. Miller,0 9 to permit

abstention from bankruptcy jurisdiction where resolution of unsettled state
property law would clarify (rather than obviate) the jurisidiction of
bankruptcy court over the disputed property. Thompson also has been

construed even more broadly, albeit in dicta in the Supreme Court's decision
in Propperv. Clark,n ° to permit abstention from bankruptcy jurisdiction in

committee reports is well aware, the references to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee
staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the
suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not primarily to inform
the Members of Congress what the bill meant (for that end Johnson would not merely have been
cited, but its 12 factors would have been described, which they were not), but rather to influence
judicial construction. What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her
citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the land, thereafter
dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.
Id. at 98-99 (emphasis in original).
206. As discussed earlier, Congress intended to abolish the distinction between summary and
plenary jurisdiction with its enactment in 1978 of a broad grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction, and did not
in 1984 intend to resurrect the summary/plenary dichotomy. See supra text accompanying note 120.
As a result, there would seem to be no need to codify the precedent permitting deference to state courts
when summary jurisdiction did not allow for the expeditious bankruptcy administration since Congress
instead sought to effectuate the goal of efficient resolution of bankruptcy cases by expanding the scope
of bankruptcy jurisdiction. Nor would it be likely to codify precedent authorizing bankruptcy courts to
defer to state court resolution because summary jurisdiction was either questionable or insufficient to
permit it to provide complete relief to litigants. For a discussion of this pre-Code case law, see supra
text accompanying notes 111-17.
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
208. See, e.g., Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th
Cir. 1987).
209. 317U.S. 178 (1942).
210. 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
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exceptional circumstances where unsettled issues of state law arise in
proceedings discrete from the remainder of the bankruptcy case, sufficiently
discrete that their resolution before the state forum would not
211 impinge on the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over other proceedings.
If Congress intended section 1334(c)(1) and former section 1471(d) to
codify Thompson, then many decisions to abstain under this provision are
wrong.2t 2 No matter how broadly Thompson is construed, it cannot be read to
permit abstention merely because unsettled issues of state law are present in
the bankruptcy-related litigation. The Supreme Court has not indicated that
the mere happenstance of bankruptcy jurisdiction, standing alone, constitutes
"exceptional circumstances" justifying abstention from unsettled issues of
state law. Nor should it be construed to permit abstention where the state law
at issue is not unsettled, or where federal law is dispositive of the
proceeding. 213 Nonetheless, courts are divided as to whether abstention from
bankruptcy jurisdiction is justified where the legal doctrine is settled but
application of these rules of state law to the factual circumstances of the
proceeding is complicated,2 14 although outside the bankruptcy context federal

211. Moreover, this possibility is unique to the bankruptcy setting. Under Pullman, the possibility
that a judgment in the state court action will foreclose the federal district court from reaching the
constitutional question posed in the stayed federal action is entirely consenant with principle that
unnecessary resolution of constitutional disputes should be avoided. Under both the Burford and
Colorado River abstention doctrines, the federal action is dismissed outright, rather than stayed, thus,
eliminating the possibility that the judgment in the state court action would infringe upon an exercise
of federal jurisdiction. Abstention from bankruptcy jurisdiction may or may not result in conflicts
between state and federal jurisdictional grants. Conflicts may not occur because bankruptcy litigation
differs from other sorts of civil litigation-it involves numerous adversary proceedings and contested
matters arising within a single bankruptcy case. As a result of this procedural distinction, it may well
be possible to "spin off" discrete portions of the bankruptcy case for resolution in a state court without
prejudicing the bankruptcy court's determination of the remaining portions of the case. Alternatively,
the state law issues raised in proceedings invoking abstention may be interwoven with federal issues
that remain. Whether conflicts in jurisdiction would result, should be determined on a case by case
basis before a court abstains from exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction.
212. Decisions affirming a district court's refusal to abstain, or reversing a district court's decision
to abstain, would not suffer from a broader abstention doctrine. Thus, the results in In re Pan Am.
Corp., 950 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's refusal to abstain), and In re Chicago,
Milvaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 6 F.3d 1184 (7th Cir. 1993) (reversing district court's abstention
decision as abuse of discretion), would be the same even under the narrow construction of Thompson
proposed above.
213. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989)
(reversing abstention determination where federal law governed dispute).
214. Compare In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litg., 78 F.3d 764, 776 (2d Cir. 1996) ("If mere
difficulty of decision is not a ground for abstention where the district court's subject matter jurisdiction
is based solely on diversity of citizenship, far less can it be a ground for abstention where, as here,
jurisdiction is also based on the bankruptcy laws."), with In re Williams, 144 F.3d 544, 550 n.4 (7th
Cir. 1998) (no mention that state landlord/tenant law was unsettled), and In re Tucson Estates, Inc.,

912 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990) (characterizing state law at issue as unsettled), and Citibank, N.A. v.
White Motor Corp. (In re White Motor Credit), 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming decision to
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courts would not abstain from these sorts of difficult decisions. And one
court has held that section 1334(c)(1) permits abstention "in the interest of
2 15
justice" from resolution of issues of purely federal law, although, as
mentioned earlier, district courts would not abstain from other grants of
federal jurisdiction on this ground.
Moreover, depending upon how narrowly Thompson is read, the decision
216
to abstain in Tucson Estates may have been improper. Like Thompson, the
state law at issue in Tucson Estates involved real property. In Thompson,
resolution of the unsettled issues of state property law would have resolved
whether that property was properly included as property of the debtor's estate
in bankruptcy. In Tucson Estates, by contrast, resolution of the issue of
property law merely resolved the scope of the implied restrictive covenant
claimed by the homeowners in that case. But resolution of this issue could
not have resulted in exclusion of the covenanted property from property of
the estate; nor would it have clarified the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
over that property. It merely affected the value of the covenanted property.
Thus, if Thompson is viewed as a variant of Pullman abstention, or if
Thompson should be read no broader than the dictum in Mangus, Tucson
Estates is not supported by Thompson.
Given this confusion regarding the effect of Thompson, it may be more
appropriate not to read the reference to it in legislative history as an
indication of Congress's intent to codify that decision. It may only indicate,
more generally, that Congress understood bankruptcy abstention to be
distinguishable from nonbankruptcy abstention, just as bankruptcy
jurisdiction is distinguishable from other grants of federal jurisdiction. Unlike
other grants of federal jurisdiction, bankruptcy jurisdiction is exercised by
non-Article III bankruptcy judges whose judicial authority is substantially
limited. Bankruptcy jurisdiction is best characterized as a blend of
specialized federal question and supplemental jurisdiction, and its breadth is
defined by reference to its functional purpose: the expeditious resolution of
federal bankruptcy cases. The remaining sections of this Article consider the
implications of these distinct interests upon bankruptcy abstention.
of justice,"
abstain from numerous peronal injury tort actions pending against debtor "in the interest
v.
without mention as to whether state tort law was unsettled), and Republic Reader's Serv., Inc.
n.4 (Bankr. S.D.
426
422,
B.R.
81
Inc.),
Serv.,
Reader's
Republic
re
(In
Inc.
Bureau,
Serv.
Magazine
the case
Tex. 1987) (construing Thompson to hold "abstention appropriate solely on the basis that
presented difficult questions of state law").
1150
215. See Mathiasen's Tanker Indus., Inc. v. Apex Oil Co. (In re Apex Oil Co.), 980 F.2d
1992).
(8th Cir.
216. See In re Tucson Estates, 912 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO ABSTAIN FROM BANKRUPTCY
JURISDICTION

Several courts have justified their broad reading of the permissive

bankruptcy abstention provision on constitutional grounds. 1 7 For example,
the court in Titan Energy observed that "[w]here a state court proceeding

sounds in state law and bears a limited connection to [a] debtor's bankruptcy
case, abstention is particularly compelling." 2 18 Comparing the proceeding

before it as involving precisely the same sorts of state law contract doctrines
at issue in Northern Pipeline, the court in Titan Energy read the Supreme
Court's decision as suggesting that federal courts should abstain from
exercising their bankruptcy jurisdiction over these sorts of suits as they are
"best left to state courts to resolve." 219 Similarly, the bankruptcy court in
Republic Reader's Service, Inc. v. Magazine Service Bureau,Inc.22 0 -which
the court in Tucson Estates relied on to develop its twelve-factor test for

permissive bankruptcy abstention 22 1-thought

that Congress intended, and

the Constitution required, the bankruptcy court to defer from exercising its
bankruptcy jurisdiction more often than with other grants of federal
jurisdiction.222 It viewed this expansive reading of the permissive bankruptcy

abstention provision as following logically from the Supreme Court's
217. If abstention from these related to proceedings is truly discretionary with the district court,
then it is difficult to imagine that section 1334(c)(1) saves the jurisdictional provision from
constitutional infirmity. If, on the other hand, it would be an abuse of the court's discretion not to
abstain from hearing related to proceedings, then the scope of the permissive abstention provision
overlaps substantially with that of the mandatory abstention provision. And, in this event, both sorts of
nondiscretionary abstention, in practical effect, more closely resemble a limitation on bankruptcy
jurisdiction than an abstention provision.
218. In re Titan Energy, Inc., 837 F.2d 325,332 (8th Cir. 1988).
219. Id. ("These claims require interpretation of the insurance contract in accordance with state
law contract doctrines. This determination involves precisely the type of issues which the Supreme
Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. MarathonPipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), deemed
best left to state courts to resolve.").
220. (In re Republic Reader's Serv., Inc.), 81 B.R. 422, 425 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987) ("The intent
of Congress is that [bankruptcy] abstention must play a far more significant role in limiting those
matters, which although properly brought within the reach of jurisdiction under Title 11, are
nonetheless best left for resolution to a state or other nonbankruptcy forum.").
221. See In re Tucson Estates, 912 F.2d at 1166-67. Although the court in Tucson Estates did not
explicitly include constitutional concerns among the twelve factors relevant to a discretionary
abstention determination, several of these factors indirectly relate to constitutional concerns:
(2) the extent to which state law issues predominate over bankruptcy issues, ... (4) the presence of
a related proceeding commenced in state court or other nonbankruptcy court, (5) the jurisdictional
basis, if any, other than 28 U.S.C. § 1334, (6) the degree of relatedness or remoteness of the
proceeding to the main bankruptcy case, (7) the substance rather than form of an asserted 'core'

proceeding.
In re Tucson Estates, 912 F.2d at 1167.
222. See In re RepublicReader's Serv., Inc., 81 B.R. at 425.
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decision in Northern Pipeline.223 The court in Republic Reader's Service
noted that courts of appeals had broadly construed the grant of bankruptcy
jurisdiction to extend to proceedings that might "conceivably have any effect
on the estate being administered in bankruptcy," 224 and that these same courts

of appeals had also calmed concerns about the exercise of this broad grant of
jurisdiction to a non-Article III bankruptcy court by construing section

1334(c)(1) as conferring a similarly broad power to abstain.225 Moreover,

after the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline but before Congress

enacted the 1984 jurisdictional provisions, many bankruptcy courts and
district courts abstained under former section 1471(d) from hearing claims
arising solely under state law, avoiding a determination on the
constitutionality of their exercise ofjurisdiction over "related to" proceedings
arising solely under state law.226
If inclined to do so, these courts could have supported their constitutional
argument with reference to legislative history. The Report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee on Senate Bill 1013 indicates that, in recommending
the enactment of a broad mandatory abstention provision, it was influenced

223. See id. ("This extension of the abstention doctrine logically resulted from the Supreme
Court's decision that a non-Article III bankruptcy court could not constitutionally determine a contract
claim based on state law brought by the debtor against a third party.").
224. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir.
1987), and Pacor,Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984)).
225. See In re Republic Reader's Serv., Inc., 81 B.R. at 425 (quoting Wood, 825 F.2d at 93). In
Wood, the Fifth Circuit expressed concern that an expansive interpretation of section 1334(b) would
bring proceedings into a federal court that were best litigated in a state court. Nonetheless, it suggested
a broad permissive bankruptcy abstention doctrine as the solution to this quandary:
There is no necessary reason why that concern must be met by restrictive interpretations of the
statutory grant ofjurisdiction under section 1334. The Act grants the district court broad power to
abstain whenever appropriate "in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State
courts or respect for State law." The abstention provisions of the Act demonstrate the intent of
Congress that concerns of comity and judicial convenience should be met, not by rigid limitations
on the jurisdiction of federal courts, but by the discretionary exercise of abstention when
appropriate in a particular case ....
In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 93; see also Kelley v. Salem Mortgage Co. (In re Salem Mortgage Co.), 783
F.2d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Reeves, 65 F.3d 670, 675 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Salem
Mortgage with approval). In Salem Mortgage, the Sixth Circuit discussed the breadth of the grant of
bankruptcy jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b):
We note that this jurisdictional grant was simultaneously qualified by the abstention provision of
28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) in the 1978 Act, now 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) .... [T]he limitations in section
1334(cXl) are sufficient to keep federal jurisdiction from becoming overextended. Congress
wisely chose a broad jurisdictional grant and a broad abstention doctrine over a narrower
jurisdictional grant so that the district court could determine in each individual case whether
hearing it would promote or impair efficient and fair adjudication of bankruptcy cases. The degree
to which the related proceeding is related to the bankruptcy case, as a practical matter, will
doubtless be an important factor in the decision whether to abstain.
Salem Mortgage,783 F.2d at 635 (citations omitted).
226. For a discussion of this case law, see supra text accompanying note 135.
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by constitutional concerns:
(a) The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 significantly expanded the scope of
Federal jurisdiction far beyond that which existed prior to the Act.
[citing Northern Pipeline]; (b) As a result of this Act, Federal courts
have been empowered to exercise jurisdiction over claims that are
governed solely by state law; (c) As a result of this Act, Federal courts
have been empowered to exercise Federal jurisdiction in cases that do
not arise under bankruptcy, and which are not based upon Federal
diversity jurisdiction, not based upon the existence of Federal question
jurisdiction, and not based in any proper sense upon Federal pendant
jurisdiction; "they are outside of the" judicial power provided for in
the Constitution ....
27
Moreover, when Congress enacted the 1984 jurisdictional provisions, several
influential members of the Senate expressed their concern at various stages in
the legislative process that the mandatory bankruptcy abstention statute did

not go far enough to delegate bankruptcy jurisdiction over state law claims to
state court resolution. 228 At the time that the Senate first adopted its

jurisdictional proposals, Senators Hatch and Heflin, both members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, contended that inclusion of the mandatory

discretionary abstention provisions was important on constitutional

grounds. 229 When several months later the Senate adopted the House bill
with changes, "[o]ne of the more significant changes [was the] retention of
the Senate provision regarding mandatory abstention.,, 230 At this time,
Senators Hatch and Heflin again justified this amendment on constitutional

227. S.REP. No. 98-55, at 18-19 (1983).
228. Normally, the comments of an individual legislator are not indicative of congressional intent.
But since there is very little other legislative history for the 1984 Amendments, courts often refer to
the comments made by various Representatives and Senators.
229. See 130 CONG. REc. 9924 (1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin); id. at 9937-39 (statement of
Sen. Hatch). However, this same legislative history also indicates that other senators believed that the
broad mandatory abstention provision was unnecessary and unwise. See id. at 9923 (statement of Sen.
Dole) (suggesting that constitutional questions surrounding bankruptcy jurisdiction are better resolved
by assigning bankruptcy cases to existing district courts, but deferring to judgment of Senate Judiciary
Committee on this issue); id. at 9975 (statement of Sen. Gorton) (contending that life-tenured
bankruptcy court is certain to both survive constitutional scrutiny and preserve administrative gains
resulting from consolidation of bankruptcy jurisdiction). The House version of the bill instead
contained a narrower mandatory abstention provision, a provision that is nearly identical to that which
was later enacted with the 1984 Amendments. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 21, 1983).
But because the House was preoccupied with debating whether bankruptcy judges should receive life
tenure and guaranteed salaries, there was no direct mention of the mandatory abstention provision
during the passage of House Bill 5174. See 130 CONG. REc. 6189-6249 (1984).
230. 130 CoNG. REc. 13,059 (1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
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grounds.231 When the narrower House version of the mandatory abstention
provision was ultimately adopted following a conference to resolve the
differences between the Senate and House versions of House Bill 5174,232
Senator Hatch voiced his concern that the compromise was unconstitutional
because it did not more expansively require federal district courts to abstain
from determining issues of state law under their bankruptcy jurisdiction.23 3
Senators Heflin and Hatch raised distinct constitutional questionsquestions that can be viewed as raising issues under Article III of the United
States Constitution regarding both the "vertical" and "horizontal" authority to
adjudicate bankruptcy-related disputes.23 4 Senator Heflin raised the vertical
question under section 1 of Article Ill. He understood the broad discretionary
and mandatory abstention provisions as direct responses to the separation of
powers issues implicated by Northern Pipeline.
This proposal addresses the constitutional flaws noted in Marathon by
enacting two substantial changes in the administration of the
bankruptcy system. First, the parties in Marathon-type litigation would
be given more control to determine the forum, including article Ill
courts, in which their cases will be heard. Second, the district court
judges would be given more control to determine the forum, including
the district court, in which Marathon-type cases will be heard.
Greater authority over the choice of forum is also given to the
parties by the abstention provisions of this legislation which amends
the existing abstention provision to allow the district court to abstain
[as provided in current § 1334(c)(1)]. It also requires the court to

231. See 130 CONG. REC. 13,063-65 (1984) (statement of Sen. Heflin); id. at 13,065-70 (statement
of Sen. Hatch). Senator DeConcini remarked, at the same time, however, that the Senate's broad
mandatory abstention provision "could endanger the operation of the entire Federal bankruptcy
system." Id. at 13,075-76 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (describing this procedure as "troublesome"
and likely to enable "those who favor delay ... limitless opportunities to create endless delays," and
stating intention to later seek amendment to bill).
232. See 130 CONG. REc. 20,225-27 (1984) (statement of Rep. Fish); id. at 20,227-28 (statement
of Sen. Kastenmeier); id. at 20,083-84 (statement of Sen. Dole).
233. See id. at 20,085 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
234. By "vertical," I refer to separation of powers questions regarding the allocation of judicial
authority between life-tenured federal district judges and untenured bankruptcy judges. By
"horizontal," I refer to federalism questions regarding the exercise of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
over proceedings arising under state law but arising in or related to the federal bankruptcy case. Both
are questions to be resolved under Article III of the United States Constitution; issues of vertical
constitutionality are governed by section 1 of Article 1I, while horizontal questions are governed by
section 2. For the text of sections 1 and 2 of Article III, see supra note 18 and infra note 244. I use
these references at the risk of confusing some proceduralists, who refer to horizontal questions as
pertaining to those among different state courts and vertical issues as arising between state and federal
courts. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 946
(1998).
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abstain [as provided in current § 1334(c)(2)].235
In Northern Pipeline,the Supreme Court construed section 1 of Article III to
permit only life-tenured federal judges to exercise the "essential attributes" of
judicial power when deciding disputes involving "private rights.''236 Northern
Pipeline found unconstitutional the broad delegation of bankruptcy
jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges who enjoyed neither life tenure nor
guarantees against salary reduction. This issue can be viewed as vertical, in
that it considers the circumstances under which an untenured judge
constitutionally can exercise judicial authority as an "adjunct" of a tenured
federal district judge. Section 157, governing the reference of jurisdiction to
non-Article III bankruptcy judges, was enacted by Congress in 1984 to
resolve these vertical constitutional issues.
But there is little connection between the permissive bankruptcy
abstention provision and any argument that the jurisdictional scheme enacted
with the 1984 Amendments unconstitutionally delegates to bankruptcy
judges too many of the essential attributes of judicial authority. Northern
Pipeline questioned the vertical allocation of bankruptcy jurisdiction between
federal district courts and federal bankruptcy courts; it did not suggest that
the horizontal allocation of bankruptcy jurisdiction among state and federal
courts was constitutionally suspect. Although both the plurality 237 and
concurring 8 opinions in Northern Pipeline emphasize the significance of
the purely private, state law claims at issue in that decision, Northern
Pipelinedoes not question the allocation ofjurisdiction over state law claims
related to the bankruptcy case among state and federal courts. Instead, it
viewed the state law origin of the cause of action at issue in Northern
Pipeline as important to vertical concerns because principles of separation of
powers is least likely to be encroached when Congress assigns jurisdiction
over claims created by it under federal law. Section 1334(c)(1) does not
address the allocation of jurisdiction between untenurel bankruptcy courts
and tenured district courts.23 9 Rather, it addresses the proper allocation of
jurisdiction between federal and state courts. In this regard, the discretionary
bankruptcy abstention provision addresses horizontal, not vertical,

235. 130 CONG. REc. 9924 (1983) (statement of Sen Heflin).
236. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83-86 (1982).

237. Only four Justices joined in the NorthernPipeline plurality decision. See id.
238. The two Justices who concurred in the judgment in Northern Pipeline did so based only on a
terse explanation of the holding. See id. at 89-92.
239. These same arguments relate to the mandatory bankruptcy abstention provision. Like the
discretionary provision, section 1334(c)(2) addresses only the proper allocation of bankruptcy
jurisdiction between federal and state courts. As such, it does not implicate these vertical constitutional
issues.
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concerns.24 °

These

horizontal

issues

concern

the

constitutionality of the breadth of the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to
district courts, and Northern Pipeline simply did not address these issues.
Senator Hatch raised the horizontal Article III question,24 1 indicating that

he viewed the bankruptcy abstention provisions as constitutionally necessary
because "bankruptcy judges [impermissibly] have taken jurisdiction over
State law issues that are vaguely related to bankruptcy proceedings but which
have no basis in Federal law at all." 242 In making this constitutional

argument, Senator Hatch relied primarily on a student Note published in the
before the Supreme Court had issued its decision in
HarvardLaw Review
243
Northern Pipeline.
The HarvardNote questioned the propriety of the breadth of the grant of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over related to proceedings governed solely
by state law. Rejecting the suggestion that, under Article I of the
Constitution, Congress could both create a trustee in bankruptcy and confer
on the federal courts jurisdiction over all controversies to which the trustee is
a party, the Note understood Article III as the exclusive source of federal
jurisdiction and as requiring identification of a "federal interest" at stake in
the litigation of the state law bankruptcy proceeding. Section 2 of Article IIn

permits Congress to confer on federal courts, among other things, jurisdiction

of cases "arising under" federal law.244 Although the Supreme Court has

240. The bankruptcy court in Republic Reader's Service appears to have understood this
distinction, although it discounted the significance of it:
It is true that placement of bankruptcy jurisdiction with the district court effected a cure of the
Marathon constitutional problem, and reference may be withdrawn as to any matter, however, the
dual forums available for hearing bankruptcy issues do not mandate that a district court exercise
jurisdiction. A state court or other nonbankruptcy forum still provides an appropriate alternative
where warranted under the abstention principles.
Republic Reader's Serv. v. Magazine Serv. Bureau, Inc. (In re Republic Reader's Ser., Inc.), 81 B.R.
422,425 n.3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987).
241. See 130 CONG. REc. 9928 (1983) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (raising "[a]n alternative article
lIt consideration, [which] tacitly influenced the [Northern Pipeline] decision, and under slightly
different circumstances might have become the primary basis for decision").
242. Id.Senator Hatch explained:
This alternative article III argument recognizes that bankruptcy courts have used the practically
limitless language of [former § 1471(b)] to assert Federal question jurisdiction over non-Federal
questions. Although bankruptcy is clearly a Federal question, State law claims do not
automatically become subject to litigation in a Federal court, perhaps even a Federal court in a
distant State, simply because it is tangentially related to a bankruptcy claim.
Id.
243. See Note, Bankruptcy and the Limits ofFederalJurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 703 (1982).
The Senate Report also cited the HarvardNote. See S. REP. No. 98-55, at 18 n.53a (1983).
244. Congress is constitutionally empowered to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts as
follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
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construed constitutional arising under jurisdiction far more broadly than
statutory arising under jurisdiction, 245 questions remain as to whether the
grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction over proceedings arising in and related to246a
title 11 case constitute a form of constitutional arising under jurisdiction.
The Note suggested that, under a broad construction of these federal

interests, Congress could grant federal jurisdiction over state law claims in
order to protect federal legislation "expressing a national policy in the area

concerned" or "when 'discrimination against federal instrumentalities' may
obstruct federal objectives," but rejected "protective jurisdiction" as
supporting the broad grant of related to bankruptcy jurisdiction because
"[w]hen state courts are viewed as the partners of federal courts, 'protective
jurisdiction' becomes an overbroad justification for federal jurisdiction over

state law claims, the resolution of which is not necessary to promote federal

objectives." 247 The Note then concluded that a narrow Article III approach
"would limit federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy to litigation within the federal
core" and identified this "core" bankruptcy jurisdiction as existing only to
conserve and equitably distribute the debtor's estate.248 It, therefore, "would
not find a federal interest implicated in a suit against a defendant who
249stood
outside the debtor-creditor relationships surrounding the bankruptcy.
The HarvardNote is right to describe the grant of related to jurisdiction
as broad, and to question how best to characterize this broad grant of
jurisdiction. Other commentators have debated whether related to jurisdiction
is better characterized as a form of protective jurisdiction, 250 supplemental

Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;between Citizens of Different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 2, cl. 1.
245. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8
(1983) (constitutional federal question jurisdiction under Article III "has long been recognized ... (as]
broader than federal-question jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1331").
246. Compare Block-Lieb, supra note 21, at 764-84 (arguing that arising in and related to
bankruptcy jurisdiction might be characterized either as a form of constitutional arising under
jurisdiction or as jurisdiction ancillary to such a grant), with Cross, supra note 21, at 1251 (contending
that related to jurisdiction is best understood as supplemental jurisdiction), and Thomas Galligan, Jr.,
Article III and the "Related To" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction:A Case Study in Protective Jurisdiction,11
U. PUGEr SOUND L. REv. 1, 5 (1987) (describing related to jurisdiction as protective jurisdiction).
247. Note, supra note 243, at 710-11; see also Cross, supra note 21, at 1204-29 (contending that
related to jurisdiction is constitutional, but not as a grant ofprotective jurisdiction).
248. Note, supra note 243, at 711.
249. Id.
250. For an argument that related to jurisdiction is best characterized as a form of protective
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or arising under jurisdiction.252 Much of this confusion is

why
Article
justified because the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated 25
3

III empowers Congress to confer bankruptcyjurisdiction broadly.

But it is quite a leap to conclude from this dearth of precedent that the

broad grant of jurisdiction over state law claims related to a bankruptcy case
is unconstitutional because it exceeds the horizontal limits set forth in Article

III. The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated in dicta that it views the
breadth of the current grant, as well as other similarly broad grants, as fitting
well within this constitutional mandate.25 4 Indeed, the plurality in Northern

Pipeline assumed the constitutionality of the broad grant of bankruptcy
jurisdiction over state law claims to federal district courts. 255 Because the

Supreme Court has not suggested that the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction
over state law claims is unconstitutionally broad, it is unlikely that courts are

constitutionally required to construe the permissive bankruptcy abstention
provision to enable federal courts to abstain more readily from their
bankruptcy jurisdiction than from other grants of federal jurisdiction.25 6
Although abstention doctrines may be rooted in constitutional

requirements, 25 7 nothing in the Constitution requires federal courts to abstain

jurisdiction, see Galligan, supra note 246, at 5.
251. See Cross, supra note 21, at 1251 ("Because all the state claims are logically related to the
federal cause of action in bankruptcy, they form part of a single federal bankruptcy 'case' for purposes
of Article III. The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction accordingly allows the entire case to be heard in a
federal court-a result fully in keeping with the limits of Article Ill."); Block-Lieb, supra note 21, at
721, 779-84 (concluding that related to jurisdiction can be characterized as supplemental jurisdiction,
and relying both on language of statutory provision and its legislative history).
252. See Block-Lieb, supra note 21, at 769-79 (arguing that related to proceedings might be
characterized as federal questions, not under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but rather as a matter of constitutional
law, because they "exist only in the context of the title 11 case" and the title 11 case "forms an
'original ingredient' of any form of bankruptcy relief, including 'arising in' and 'related to'
proceedings occurring in the case").
253. For discussions of this case law, see Block-Lieb, supra note 21, at 764-66 nn.272-73; Cross,
supra note 21, at 1207-08; Galligan, supranote 246, at 23-30.
254. See Cross, supra note 21, at 1207-08.
255. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 72 n.26 (1982)
(asserting without much discussion that "[tihis [related to] claim may be adjudicated in federal court
on the basis of its relationship to the petition for reorganization").
256. This same argument applies to the mandatory bankruptcy provision. If bankruptcy
jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on district courts, then the Constitution does not require
district courts to abstain from its exercise.
257. Commentators debate whether the Constitution requires district courts to abstain from
exercising federal grants of jurisdiction when this exercise would encroach upon state sovereignity.
Compare Calvin R Massey, Abstention and the ConstitutionalLimits of the Judicial Power of the
United States, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 811 (arguing that many abstention doctrines are constitutionally
required), with MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 47-74 (1991)
(arguing that judge-made abstention doctrines are illegitimate usurpation of congressional authority to
define federal jurisdiction). If the Constitution requires federal courts to abstain in order to avoid
treading on important state interests, it probably requires them to abstain only sparingly. See infra text
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from exercising their bankruptcy jurisdiction more often than with other

grants of federal jurisdiction.
V. IS ABSTENTION FROM BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION ANALAGOUS TO

DECLINING TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION?

As noted above, several courts of appeals consider "the degree of
relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to the main bankruptcy case" in
determining whether to permit abstention under section 1334(c)(1).258 If
constitutional concerns do not justify this focus, might there be some other
explanation?
Although nowhere made explicit, these courts might be contrasting a
determination to abstain from exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction over federal
proceedings that arise under the Bankruptcy Code from a decision to decline
jurisdiction over state law proceedings that arise in or are related to a
bankruptcy case. 9 While arising under proceedings present federal
questions for which federal jurisdiction would exist even absent the grant of
bankruptcy jurisdiction in section 1334(b), arising in and related to
proceedings certainly would not fit within the scope of section 1331, the
statute conferring federal question jurisdiction. Arising in and related to
proceedings also are difficult to characterize as "arising under.., the laws of
the United States" within the meaning of section 2 of Article III, although
this section of the Constitution has been construed more broadly than the
federal question jurisdiction statute.260 If bankruptcy jurisdiction over
accompanying notes 267-69 (discussing separation of powers reasons for construing abstention
doctrines narrowly).
258. In re Tucson Estates, Inc., 912 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting the sixth factor from
In re RepublicReader's Se,., Inc., 81 B.R_ at 429). For other decisions emphasizing the "relatedness"
of the proceeding to a determination to abstain from an exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction, see supra
text accompanying notes 217-26.
259. Indeed, the twelve-factor test employed by the court in Tucson Estates at times resembles the
four-factor test for declining supplemental jurisdiction. Tucson Estates test provides, in part:
(2) the extent to which state law issues predominate over bankruptcy issues, (3) the difficulty or
unsettled nature of the applicable law, (4) the presence of a related proceeding commenced in state
court or other nonbankruptcy court, (5) the jurisdictional basis, if any, other than 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334, (6) the degree of relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to the main bankruptcy case.
In re Tucson Estates,Inc., 912 F.2d at 1167. Similarly, section 1376(c) provides:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim sustantially predominates
over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in excejptional
circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1994).
260. A distinction exists between statutory and constitutional federal question jurisdiction because
the Supreme Court has long held that congressional power under Article Ill to confer federal question
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proceedings arising in or related to a bankruptcy case cannot be characterized
as a species of arising under jurisdiction, 26 1 then it is probably best
characterized as supplemental jurisdiction-jurisdiction supplemental to the
federal bankruptcy case. 262 But if jurisdiction over proceedings arising in or
related to a bankruptcy case is supplemental jurisdiction, then requests to
defer to state court resolution of these proceedings may find closer analogy in
common law doctrine vesting in federal courts the discretion to decline to
federal courts to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction than that
• • • empowering
265
abstain from the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
Despite the logic of this position, the plain language of the affected
statutes does not support it. Most significantly, section 1334(c)(1) sets forth
but one standard for abstention from any sort of bankruptcy jurisdiction. If
Congress had intended to distinguish between abstaining from proceedings
arising under federal bankruptcy law and declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over proceedings arising in or related to a federal bankruptcy
case it would have more clearly delineated this disinction. Instead, section
1334(c)(1) permits district courts to "abstain[] from hearing a particular
proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title
11" when "in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State
courts or respect for State law," without distinguishing between proceedings
arising under the264Bankruptcy Code and proceedings arising in or related to a
bankruptcy case.

When Congress wants to grant to federal courts broad and expansive
statutory discretion to decline jurisdiction, it does so with unambiguous
language. As noted above, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) permits district courts to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the broadly permissive
grounds set forth in that statute.265 The language in section 1334(c)(1) differs
dramatically from this more expansive authorization to decline to exercise
jurisdiction in section 1367(c). Section 1334(c)(1) speaks in terms of an
"abstention" from bankruptcy jurisdiction, unlike section 1367(c), which

jurisdiction is far broader than that conferred by statute under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See, e.g., Franchise
Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8 (1983).
261. For an argument that arising in and related to bankruptcy jurisdiction constitutes a type of
federal question jurisdiction within the meaning of Article HI, see Block-Lieb, supra note 21, at 76979.

262. See Cross, supra note 21, at 1251; Block-Lieb, supranote 21, at 721,779-84.
263. For a discussion of the case law governing federal courts' discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, see supra text accompanying notes 75-85. For a discussion of the case law
governing their ability to abstain from exercising original federal jurisdiction, see supra text
accompanying notes 24-74.
264. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1994).
265. For the text of28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), see supra text accompanying note 83.
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authorizes district courts to "decline to exercise" their supplemental
jurisdiction. In addition, section 1367(c) more clearly describes this as a
determination within the discretion of the district courts, providing that they
"may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction;" section 1334(c)(1), by
contrast, only indirectly permits district courts to abstain from exercising
their bankruptcy jurisdiction by providing that "[n]othing in this section
prevents a district court ...from abstaining from hearing a particular
proceeding." Finally, section 1367(c) permits district courts to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction on four grounds, with the broadest of these
expansively authorizing the court to decline this jurisdiction "in exceptional
circumstances, [whenever] there are other compelling reasons." This
standard finds no counterpart in the statutory language of the Judicial Code,
266
but legislative history indicates that Congress intended to codify Gibbs.
The language of section 1334(c)(1), permitting abstention "in the interest of
justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law,"
is reminiscent of common law abstention doctrines, and legislative history
supports this reference.
Nor is justification for this position found in the policies supporting
distinct rules for a determination to abstain from an exercise of federal
jurisdiction and one to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Abstention doctrines are narrowly defined because these judicially-crafted
doctrines exist in apparent conflict with the obligation of a federal court to
exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by statute. The Supreme Court has
admonished that limits on the power to abstain derives from "the undisputed
constitutional principle that Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the
scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible
bounds.267 By contrast, the discretion of a federal court to decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction is broadly defined because, as initially
conceived, separation of powers concerns were absent from this

266. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, at 28-29 & n.15 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860,
6874-75.
267. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1989); see
also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (Courts "have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The
one or the other would be treason to the constitution."). The Court in New Orleans Pub. Se,.
indicated:
That principle does not eliminate, however, and the categorical assertions based upon it do not call
into question, the federal courts' discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of
relief-a discretion that was part of the common-law background against which the statutes
conferring jurisdiction were enacted.
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 359 (citing David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion,

60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,570-77 (1985)).
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determination to contract the scope of supplemental jurisdiction. If anything,
separation of powers concerns ran the other direction-questioning the
authority of courts to expand upon statutory grants of jurisdiction without
direction from the legislature.2 68 Before enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
supplemental jurisdiction was not jurisdiction that had been conferred on
federal courts by statutes. Since supplemental jurisdiction was, by definition,
judicially-crafted jurisdiction, it was jurisdiction that federal courts were not
obligated by statute to exercise. The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
was understood to be discretionary with the federal court. Moreover, the
determination to decline to exercise that jurisdiction was also understood to
be defined by common-law principles of equity and fairness. Section 1367,
the supplemental jurisdiction provision, merely codifies this case law.269
Federal jurisdiction over proceedings arising in and related to a
bankruptcy case did not develop in the same way as the supplemental
jurisdiction conferred on district courts by section 1367. Section 1367
codified United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.Y The bankruptcy jurisdictional
provision, section 1334(b), did not codify judicially-created jurisdictional
doctrines. Instead, it overrode and substantially extended pre-Code
jurisdictional statutes.27' And although, under the former Act of 1898,
bankruptcy courts could have declined to exercise their summary bankruptcy
jurisdiction if its scope was unclear, or insufficient to resolve a complex
dispute,272 with its enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, Congress clearly
sought to abolish the distinction between summary and plenary bankruptcy
jurisdiction precisely because it viewed this fractionalization of jurisdiction
among federal and state courts as inconsistent with efficient bankruptcy
administration. Nor is there any indication on the face of the statute
conferring bankruptcy jurisdiction that Congress viewed this grant of
jurisdiction as "discretionary" with the district court.
Where Congress confers discretionary federal jurisdiction, courts have
more broadly defined the grounds for abstaining from the exercise of this
jurisdiction. For example, distinct standards govern abstention from federal

268. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). The Court's decision in Finley explains
Congress's decision to codify the doctrines of ancillary and pendantjurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
269. Since 1990, supplemental jurisdiction has been conferred by statute. At the same time, and in
the same statute, Congress codified the standard governing a decision to decline supplemental
jurisdiction in section 1367(c). Nonetheless, courts have construed section 1367(c) consistent with this
earlier case law, concluding that the decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary with
the district court and permitting numerous factors to justify such an abdiction ofjurisdiction.
270. See supra note 84.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 118-27 (discussing legislative history of bankruptcy
jurisdictional provision enacted with 1978 Bankruptcy Code).
272. For a discussion of this pre-Code case law, see supra text accompanying notes 110-17.
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declaratory judgement actions because the Supreme Court has characterized
jurisdiction over declaratory judgement actions as "nonobligatory" and

"discretionary." 273 A district court may, in its discretion, abstain from the
declaratory judgement action in favor of a parallel state court action, even in
the absence of exceptional circumstances. 274 It would be difficult to argue,
along the same lines, that section 1334(b) confers discretionary bankruptcy
jurisdiction. The bankruptcy jurisdictional provision does not speak in
similarly discretionary terms, instead providing that "the district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising

under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11."275 Moreover,
had Congress understood the broad grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to be

discretionary, enactment of the mandatory abstention provision would have
been viewed as unnecessary.
VI. THE BANKRUPTCY GOAL OF EXPEDITED ADMINISTRATION
Several courts of appeals have construed the permissive bankruptcy

abstention provision broadly in order to foster expeditious resolution of
litigation before bankruptcy courts. 276 This reading of section 1334(c)(1)

273. The Court in Wilton distinguished the distinct standards applied in Brillhart v. Excess
Insurance Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942), and Colorado River Conservation Districtv. United States, 424

U.S. 800 (1976), as justified by the broadly discretionary language of the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act:
By the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought to place a remedial arrow in the district court's
quiver, it created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying
litigants. Consistent with the nonobligatory nature of the remedy, a district court is authorized, in
the sound exercise of its discretion, to stay or dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment
before trial or after all arguments have drawn to a close [in a state court action].
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277,288 (1995).
274. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286; Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
275. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
276. See, e.g., In re Tucson Estates, Inc., 912 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1990) (considering "the
effect or lack thereof on the efficient administration of the estate if a Court recommends abstention").
In large bankruptcy cases with hundreds or even thousands of tort litigants beating on the door of
one federal judge, judicial health and survival, or at least judicial economy and expeditiousness,
may depend on the court's authority to refer cases to other courts. Since the 1984 Bankruptcy Act
prevents reference of these tort cases to bankruptcy courts, as in the past, it makes good sense to
give the district courts wide latitude in referring the cases through abstention to other courts.
Citibank, N.A. v. White Motor Corp. (In re White Motor Corp.), 761 F.2d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1985);
see also Arnold Print Works, Inc. v. Apkin (In re Arnold Print Works, Inc.), 815 F.2d 165, 171 (1st
Cir. 1987) (implying that bankruptcy court should rarely abstain from hearing and determining core
proceeding); A.H. Robins, Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994, 1016 (4th Cir. 1986)
(indicating in dicta that, in subsequently determining whether thousands of pending tort actions should
be transferred to a district court, the court should balance the benefits of a single forum for resolution
of all claims against the debtor with the hardships that such a transfer would impose on the individual
plaintiffs); Kelley v. Nodine (In re Salem Mortgage Co.), 783 F.2d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting
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differs from the practice followed outside the bankruptcy context. With the
exception of the Colorado River abstention doctrine, the nonbankruptcy
abstention doctrines generally ignore principles ofjudicial economy.277
The language of the permissive abstention provision provides limited
support for this construction. When these provisions permit abstention "in the
interest of justice," they employ the language also found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404-the federal venue transfer provision.278 Section 1404 permits district
courts to consider whether venue transfer would suit, not just the
"convenience of the parties and witnesses," but also judicial convenience.
For example, courts have considered their own crowded dockets in
determining whether to grant a motion for change of venue.2 79
The legislative history of the permissive bankruptcy abstention provision
also lends some support to this position. It provides that the statute is
necessary "to insure that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is exercised
only when appropriate to the expeditious disposition of bankruptcy cases. 280
Only in exceptional circumstances will abstention from the exercise of
bankruptcy jurisdiction expedite resolution of an entire bankruptcy case,
however. Abstention necessarily divides the exercise of the broad grant of
bankruptcy jurisdiction among federal and state courts. This division of
that Congress was wise to choose a broad jurisdictional grant and a broad abstention doctrine so that
district courts would be able to determine whether hearing a particular case would promote or impair
efficient and fair adjudication" of bankruptcy case. Moreover, "[tihe degree to which the related
proceeding is related to the bankruptcy case, as a practical matter, will doubtless be an important factor
in the decision whether to abstain."); In re Med General, Inc., 672 F.2d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 1982)
("Much of the jurisdiction now conferred on the bankruptcy courts is new, a creature of the reform of
1978. Section 1471(d) was intended by Congress to give those courts the flexibility to handle their new
powers judiciously.").
277. Indeed, one of the principles criticisms of the abstention doctrines is that abstention protects
harmonious relations between federal and state courts at the cost of litigants' convenience. See supra
notes 34-35. Under Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), and also Thompson v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940), a pending federal action is stayed, and the parties are
directed to commence an action before the state courts. Only after the resolution of the state action, is
the stay of the federal action lifted and the parties permitted to continue litigation of their federal
claims before a federal tribunal. Principles of judicial economy dictate that the federal court having
jurisdiction over both the state and federal claims resolve both claims if the federal court was chosen
by the litigants. However, interests in comity with state courts instead direct that the federal court
abstain from exercising this jurisdiction, in favor of state court resolution.
278. This provision permits district courts to "transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought" where transfer is "[flor the convenience of parties and
witnesses, [or] in the interest ofjustice." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
279. See, e.g., Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1993); Mercier v.
Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 935 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1991).
280. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 51 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5962, 6012. It also
provides that abstention should not occur, in the interest of justice, where there exists no court other
than the bankruptcy court with jurisdiction to adjudicate the entire proceeding at issue. See H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 51 (1997), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5962, 6013.
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jurisdiction creates incentives for delay and, therefore, contradicts the
bankruptcy policy favoring expedited bankruptcy administration for two
reasons. First, the division gives parties an additional layer of jurisdictional
and procedural issues for litigation. Because the standard for permissive
bankruptcy abstention is broad and somewhat amorphous, division of
jurisdiction provides a party with deep pockets and an incentive for delay
with a basis for dragging out the litigation on this threshold procedural issue.
Second, even if courts could formulate brightline rules governing abstention,
the division of bankruptcy jurisdiction would still postpone expeditous
resolution of bankruptcy cases because litigation conducted in multiple fora
is generally more time consuming and expensive for the debtor than litigation
conducted in a single bankruptcy forum.
A student Note published in the Texas Law Review (and relied upon by
Senator Hatch to support the broad mandatory abstention provision he
favored) hst argued that former section 1471(d) should be construed
expansively to permit abstention in order to expedite administration of
bankruptcy cases.2 8' The Note contended that former section 1471(d)'s
reference to an "interest in justice" should be interpreted to "include[] an
interest in efficient, fair distribution of judicial resources. 282 Where
resolution of bankruptcy-related proceedings in state court would not
"significantly impair the administration of the estate to which the proceeding
relates," the Note recommended that courts should
abstain from exercising
2 83
their bankruptcy jurisdiction over the proceedings.
The Texas Note exaggerates the likelihood that an exercise of bankruptcy
jurisdiction would delay administration of bankruptcy cases, however, for it
was written before the courts of appeals had an opportunity to construe the
breadth of the provisions broadly conferring bankruptcy jurisdiction on
district and bankruptcy courts. It relies on a quote from the leading treatise to
the effect that the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction "has no conceptual
limit 284 and should extend to any proceeding if it "could conceivably have

281. See David L. Bryant, Note, Selective Exercise of Jurisdictionin Bankruptcy-Related Civil
Proceedings, 59 TEX. L. REV. 325 (1981). Arguing in favor of a broader mandatory abstention
provision, Senator Hatch relied, not only on the HarvardNote, discussed supra text accompanying
notes 243-49, but also on this Texas Note.
282. Note, supra note 281, at 326.
283. Id. The Texas Note also argues:
[A] court should hear and decide a bankruptcy-related civil proceeding only if its resolution in a

nonbankruptcy forum would significantly impair administration of the estate to which the
proceeding relates, or if the bankruptcy court could hear the proceeding as part of a title 11 case
with little additional use of the court's resources.
Id. at 333.
284. IL at 329 (quoting I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 3.01[l][e], at 3-48 to -49(15th ed. 1979)).
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any effect upon the estate being administered., 285 Based on this broad
language, and a baker's dozen bankruptcy court decisions issued within
several years after enactment of the newly expanded bankruptcy
jurisdictional provision, the Note questions whether bankruptcy cases will be
expeditiously administered if bankruptcy courts exercise the full breadth of
this grant of jurisdiction.28 6 But courts of appeals have not construed the

bankruptcy jurisdictional provision as broadly as might have been predicted
in 1981.
The broadest grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction, jurisdiction over
proceedings related to a bankruptcy case, has since been construed by several
circuits to cover only those proceedings with a direct, legal effect upon the

bankruptcy estate-proceedings that could affect distributions from, or
administration of, the estate.28 7 True, some circuits have adopted a standard
of related to jurisdiction that, at first blush, sounds far broader-a standard
that requires only that the activity have some conceivable impact on the
bankruptcy reorganization or estate, and does not require that this impact be
either direct or legal. 28 8 However, the Supreme Court recently characterized

285. Note, supra note 281, at 329-30.
286. See id. "Although this expanded jurisdiction will cause bankruptcy courts to hear more
lawsuits, whether it will achieve Congress' goal-an efficient, convenient, and fair bankruptcy judicial
system-is uncertain. Instead, it may create new delays and waste limited judicial resources by
increasing the congestion of bankruptcy court dockets." Id. at 33 1.
287. See Home Ins. Co. v. Cooper& Cooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746,749 (7th Cir. 1989), stating:
Overlap between the bankrupt's affairs and another dispute is insufficient unless its resolution also
affects the bankrupt's estate or the allocation of its assets among creditors. Although the
[proceeding at issue on appeal] has a nexus with the bankruptcy-in the sense that it would be
convenient, and promote consistency, to resolve all questions conceming the [insurance] policy at
one go-it does not necessarily have a financial effect on the estate (or the apportionment among
its creditors).
Id.; see also Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins (In re Pacor, Inc.), 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (initially
defining related to jurisdiction as existing over bankruptcy proceeding if "the outcome of that
proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy" and
later qualifying this standard by stating that related to jurisdiction exists "if the outcome [of the
proceeding] could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or
negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt
estate" (emphasis omitted)); Gardner v. United States (In re Gardner), 913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir.
1990) (holding that "bankruptcy court lacks related jurisdiction to resolve controversies between third
party creditors which do not involve debtor or his property unless the court cannot complete
administrative duties without resolving the controversy" (citation omitted)).
288. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987) (determining that
related to jurisdiction tums on "'whether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any
effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy' (citing Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins (In re Pacor),
743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)) (emphasis omitted)); Miller v. Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum,
Inc.), 910 F.2d 784, 788 & n. 19 (11th Cir. 1990) (adopting Pacor court's "conceivable effect"
standard as definitive of related to jurisdiction without reference to qualifying language that appears in
next sentence of Pacor).
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this distinction
among circuit courts' definitions of this jurisdictional grant as
"slight." 289 Moreover, even under the broader conception of related to
bankruptcy jurisdiction, courts of appeals regularly have found bankruptcy
jurisdiction to be wanting.290 If related to jurisdiction is narrowly defined
according to its functional purpose, then there would be no need to abstain
from bankruptcy jurisdiction in order to achieve this functional goal. Where
resolution of the proceeding would not expedite administration of the
bankruptcy case, bankruptcy jurisdiction would not exist, thus rendering a
determination to abstain on this ground irrelevant.
More importantly, it is not at all clear that the Texas Note was correct in
asserting that a broad standard of bankruptcy jurisdiction creates overburdened dockets in bankruptcy courts. Due to the financial exigencies
inherent in bankruptcy litigation, many of the law suits occurring in
bankruptcy are settled by the parties. If anything, adding the possibility of
abstention under an amorphous and discretionary standard would delay
bankruptcy because it provides parties with another layer of procedural issues
to litigate.
In limited circumstances, abstention from a proceeding may speed up the
closure of the case, but these circumstances are limited. Where litigation was
pending in state court before commencement of the bankruptcy case, state
court resolution of the litigation may be quicker than repeating the process in
front of the bankruptcy court. Abstention in favor of a pending state court
action is most likely to expedite
resolution of the bankruptcy case where the
29
state litigation is close to trial. '
For example, in Tucson Estates, the court of appeals emphasized that the

289. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1995) (discussing "slight differences"
between circuit courts' definitions of related to jurisdiction, and concluding only that "these cases
make clear that bankruptcy courts have no jurisdiction over proceedings that have no effect on the

debtor").
290. See, e.g., In re Pacor,Inc., 743 F.2d 984 (finding no related to bankruptcy jurisdiction over a
personal injury tort claim brought by a consumer against a supplier, although the supplier had filed a
third party complaint against the manufacturer and the third party claim was stayed by the
manufacturer's chapter 11 filing; the consumer's claim was described as "mere precursor to potential
third party claim for indemnification" by the supplier against the manufacturer because the
manufacturer would not be barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel from relitigating any issue
decided in the suit between the consumer and the supplier, nor would the consumer's action create
automatic liability against the manufacturer).
291. Following the entry of ajudgment in the state court action, interests in judicial economy may
prompt the bankruptcy court to abstain in favor of the state appellate process. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine would preclude the bankruptcy court any relitigation on the merits. See, e.g., Baldino v.
Wilson (In re Wilson), 116 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1997) (reversing denial of relief from automatic stay
sought by judgment debtor in order to pursue appeal of prepetition state court judgment against debtor
and holding that bankruptcy court abused its discretion under section 362(d)(1) because RookerFeldman doctrine would have precluded it from reconsidering merits of state court judgment).
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debtor had filed its bankruptcy petition more than six years after the
commencement of the state action pending against it, filing only after losing
an important summary judgement motion.292 It viewed this delay in filing as
"forum shopping to avoid imminent defeat in state court,

'293

because the

plaintiff-homeowners in that action were ready for jury trial in state court.
Similarly, in Siragusa v. Siragusa, the circuit court emphasized that the
debtor, Mr. Siragusa, had waited until after the Nevada state court had
entered an order modifying the alimony award before bringing this complaint
court-a sequence of events the court characterized as
before the bankruptcy
29 4
forum shopping.

The fact that a parallel action is pending before a state court should not,
standing alone, establish that abstention would speed resolution of the
bankruptcy case. In making the determination that abstention fosters
expeditious bankruptcy administration, it is important to distinguish between
the parties' interests in expeditiously resolving the litigated proceeding
pending in the state court and the interests of all affected parties in
expeditiously resolving the bankruptcy case in its entirety. Courts of appeals
have, in some instances, focused on this distinction. For example, in Tucson
Estates, the court of appeals concluded that abstention would facilitate the
expeditious resolution of the debtor's bankruptcy estate "by liquidating 1,600
- 2,300 class action plaintiff claims." 295 By contrast, in declining to abstain
from a bankruptcy court action involving resolution of unsettled issues of
state law, the court of appeals in EastportAssociaties emphasized that timely
resolution of the declaratory judgment action was essential to an expeditious
resolution of the debtor's reorganization case.2 96 The court concluded that
abstention would slow down the reorganization process because Eastport
would have to start all over again in state court if the bankruptcy court were

292. See Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1169 (9th
Cir. 1990).
293. Id. at 1169.
294. See In re Siragusa, 27 F.3d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Fourth, the bankruptcy judge called
Dr. Siragusa's belated federal action an attempt at 'an end run over the state court jurisdiction,' which
was tantamount to a finding that the proceeding in bankruptcy court involved forum shopping.").
295. In re Tucson Estates, Inc., 912 F.2d at 1169. The court's abstention decision may have been
influenced by a disagreement among circuit courts as to whether class proofs of claim are permissible
in bankruptcy. Compare Sheftelman v. Standard Metals Corp. (In re Standard Metals Corp.), 817 F.2d
625 (10th Cir. 1987) (impermissible), with Reid v. White Motor Corp., 886 F.2d 1462 (6th Cir. 1989)
(permissible), and Certified Class in the Charter See. Litig. v. The Charter Co. (In re The Charter Co.),
876 F.2d 866 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (permissible).
296. See EastportAssoc. v.City ofLos Angeles (In re EastportAssoc.), 935 F.2d 1071, 1078 (9th
Cir. 1991) ("The resolution of the entitlement issue will substantially affect the administration of the
estate. The land is question is Eastport's sole asset. Whether it can be developed will determine the
most sensible plan for Eastport's reorganization as well as the value of the property.").
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ordered to abstain.29 7 The court distinguished Tucson Estates on this ground,
contending that "the state law issues here determine not only the value of the
property [as was involved in Tucson
Estates] but the entire nature of the
298
business undergoing reorganization.,
Abstention may expedite the litigation but delay administration of the
bankruptcy case when multiple abstention requests are made in a single case.
The starkest example of this exists in the mass tort 99 bankruptcy cases 300 in
which hundreds, even thousands, of tort actions may be pending against the
debtor in state and federal courts across the nation. Some or all of these
plaintiffs may request that the bankruptcy court abstain in favor of state court
resolution of their claim, and, if considered on an individual basis, the court
may conclude that abstention is justified for the convenience of the parties or
witnesses in at least those state court actions that have made significant
progress toward trial. If considered in the aggregate, the court still may
conclude that abstention is justified "in the interest of justice." This is logical
because it is hard to fathom how all of the pending tort actions could be
resolved in a single bankruptcy forum. The non-Article III bankruptcy court
is precluded by statute from entering a final judgment resolving these
personal injury tort or wrongful death actions. 30 ' The district court has the
statutory power to conduct the hundreds or thousands of jury trials on these
tort claims,30 2 but this exercise stretches the concept of life tenure.
Notwithstanding the convenience to litigants, witnesses and the court,
however, where abstention would delay administration of the mass tort
bankruptcy case, it should not be ordered under the permissive bankruptcy
abstention provision.

297. See id.at 1079. Although there was no pending state court action in EastportAssoc., forum
shopping most definately occurred in that case. After losing a motion for summary judgment and
before trial in the declaratory judgement action, Eastport lobbied for and obtained an amendment to
state zoning law so that the circumstances confronting Eastport would be covered. The court also

distinguished Tucson Estates in that no state court action was pending in this instance. See id.
Nonetheless, this forum shopping was not viewed as determinative.
298. Id.
299. For a definition of the term "mass tort," see Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the

Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295, 296 n.1 (1996) [hereinafter Nagareda, In the Aftermath]
(defining term "to refer to tortious conduct that affects large numbers of geographically dispersed
persons and that gives rise to latent disease"). See also Richard A. Nagared OutrageousFortune and
the Criminalization ofMass Torts, 96 MICH. L.REV. 1121, 1121 n.1 (1998) [hereinafter Nagareda,
Outrageous Fortune] (same); Richard A. Nagareda, Turningfrom Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 899, 905-08 (1996) [hereinafter Nagareda, Turningfrom Tort] (same).
300. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413 (1998)
(describing the Johns-Manville and A.H. Robins reorganizations as probably the most famous of these
mass tort bankruptcy cases).
301. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B)(1994).
302. See id. § 157(b)(5).
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Courts are divided as to whether abstention from personal injury tort and
wrongful death actions pending against the debtor in a mass tort bankruptcy
case is appropriate under the permissive bankruptcy abstention provision.30 3
In Citibank, N.A. v. White Motor Corp.,3 4 the Sixth Circuit adopted a policyoriented factor approach when the court reviewed the district court's decision
to abstain from exercising related to bankruptcy jurisdiction 30 5 over hundreds
of tort actions pending in state court against the debtor-in-possession. 30 6 In
concluding, among other things, 307 that the district court was authorized by
section 1334(c)(1) to leave these tort actions in the state courts in which they
had been pending on the filing date, the court of appeals found that
abstention would be in the interest of justice.308 The court of appeals
reasoned that if these actions were tried against the debtor in the district
court, they would unfairly be tried a second time against the debtors'
codefendants because only the state courts had jurisdiction over these
nondebtor parties. 30 9 The court also found that abstention was consistent with
notions ofjudicial economy, since it thought that the district court would be
deluged if it were required to hear and determine all tort actions pending

303. For two other decisions construing section 1334(c)(1) to preclude abstention from mass tort
claims, see Coker v. PanAm. World Airways (In re PanAm. Corp.), 950 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1991); In re
JointE. and S. Dist.Asbestos Litg., 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996).
304. (In re White Motor Credit), 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985).
305. Because they seek recovery from the property of the estate of the debtor-in-possession, the
plaintiffs in these pending tort actions likely would file proofs of claim against the estate. See 1
U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994). Even if they did not, a proof could be filed on their behalf. See id. § 501(c).
Ordinarily, core proceedings include the "allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate," but,
by statute, core proceedings are defined to exclude "the liquidation [and] estimation of contingent
[and] unliquidated personal injury tort [and] wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of
distribution in a case under title 11." Id. § 157(b)(2)(B).
306. See In re White Motor Credit, 761 F.2d at 271 (noting that "approximately 160 separate,
unliquidated and contingent products liability personal injury cases have been filed in various state and
federal courts against the debtor, White Motor Corp., a truck manufhcturer").
307. The court of appeals in In re White Motor Creditalso held that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) did not
preclude the district court from exercising its powers of discretionary abstention. Section 157(b)(5)
provides, in full:
The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be tried in
the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in
which the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1994). Despite the unambiguous language of this provision that personal injury
tort and wrongful death actions be heard "in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending,
or in the district court in the district in which the claim arose," the Sixth Circuit held that it did not
preclude the district court from abstaining from the exercise of the jurisdiction under section
1334(c)(1). See In re White Motor Credit,761 F.2d at 273.
308. See In re White Motor Credit,761 F.2d at 273.
309. The court of appeals also hinted that, even if it had supplemental jurisdiction over these
actions pending against the codefendants, abstention would be appropriate since issues of state law
would predominate over issues of federal law. See id. at 274.
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against the debtor.310 It viewed the prospect of "hundreds or even thousands
of tort litigants beating on the door of one federal judge" as threatening to the
' judicial health and survival" of that court.3 t
However, the Sixth Circuit appears to have reconsidered the wisdom of
broad grants of abstention in mass tort bankruptcy cases. In In re Dow
Corning Corp.,3 1 z the district court had entered a "global" abstention order,
concluding that the bankruptcy court should defer in favor of state court
resolution of the numerous personal injury tort actions pending against the
debtor. Citing the Second Circuit's decision in Pan American with approval,
the court of appeals in Dow Corningreversed and remanded, concluding that
the district court had failed to articulate what issues of unsettled state law
existed in each pending tort action.313 It nowhere discussed the practical

difficulty of resolving these numerous state court actions in a single federal
forum, but instead emphasized that "[fjailing to transfer the claims against
the shareholders will likely affect the size of the estate and the length of time
the bankruptcy proceedings will be pending, as well as Dow
314 Coming's
reorganization."
with
proceed
and
liabilities
its
resolve
to
ability
Dow Corning is difficult to reconcile with White Motor. With its
reference to the Second Circuit's decision in PanAmerican, the court in Dow
Corningappears to reject the multifactored balancing approach to permissive

310. Seeid.at274.
311. Id. In concluding that abstention was necessary in order protect the "judicial health and
survival" of the district court, the Sixth Circuit was constrained somewhat by 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(B), which characterizes the liquidation of personal injury tort or wrongfuil death claims as
noncore proceedings that could not be finally determined by the bankruptcy court, absent the consent
of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c). "Since the 1984 Bankruptcy Act prevents reference of these
tort cases to bankruptcy courts, as in the past, it makes good sense to give the district courts wide
latitude in referring the cases through abstention to other courts." In re White Motor Credit, 761 F.2d
at 274.
312. Lindsey v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re Dow Coming Corp.), 113 F.3d 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 435 (1997).
313. The court of appeals described the district court's "legal rationale [as] wholly inadequate."
Id. at 570.
The district court did not examine a single tort claim to determine whether discretionary
abstention was appropriate in the interests of justice and comity. The district court briefly
mentioned principles of federalism and comity, as well as the state law nature of the claims, as
bases for discretionary abstention. Although the cases are premised on state law, the district court
did not indicate why the state law nature of the claims justified discretionary abstention; indeed, it
appears that it does not. The district court ignored the fact that at least some of the claims have an
independent basis for jurisdiction in federal court. Moreover, there is no suggestion that the state
law issues in these case are unique, unsettled, or difficult. Thus, the principles of federalism and
comity would not be violated by the district court's assumption of jurisdiction over these cases.
The breast-implant litigation truly is a nationwide issue, and no state has a paramount interest in
the litigation.
Id.at 570-71 (citations omitted).
314. Id.at571.
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bankruptcy abstention used in White Motor in favor of the view that section
1334(c)(1) incorporates pre-Code abstention doctrines. White Motor and
Dow Corning are probably better explained by reference to the debate
surrounding mass tort litigation.315
Although mass tort litigation has evolved substantially in the years that
separate these two decisions,316 there is still substantial disagreement as to
whether mass tort claims are best resolved on an individuated or consolidated
318
basis. 317 Nonbankruptcy methods of aggregation-i.e., consolidation,

315. In re White Motor Credit can also be explained as a decision written in the shadow of
Northern Pipeline, with an earlier appellate decision affirming the constitutionality of the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction over these products liability actions under the interim rule. See White
Motor Corp. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re White Motor Corp.), 704 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983). Affirmance of
the district court's later abstention decision must be viewed in the context of this substantial
constitutional uncertainty. Indeed, some courts continue to think that a broad permissive abstention
doctrine is mandated on constitutional grounds. See supratext accompanying notes 217-26.
316. See Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An InstitutionalEvolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 941, 944 (1995) (developing institutional evolutionist perspective to assess developments in mass
tort litigation). "If today's mass tort litigation truly differs from earlier versions, what factors produced
these changes? Have these changes been for the better? How does the current mass tort regime
compare with other possible approaches?" Id.
317. John Coffee argues:
Class action developments have given rise to a new legal technology that threatens to strip tort
victims of their legal claims, sometimes decades before they even mature.... If fully exploited,
these techniques-particularly the use of mandatory classes, settlement classes and future claimant
classes-could create a new, even more protective form of limited liability for corporations.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1343, 1461 (1995).
Peter H. Schuck records a similar skeptical view of the courts.
Torts scholars charge that mass tort litigation often produces arbitrary results; that it fails to deliver
the right compensation to the right victims when it is most needed; that it misallocates risk among
consumers, corporations, and governments; that it generates unconscionable waste; and that it
does not achieve corrective justice. They argue that the legal actors in the mass tort drama-selfserving, entrepreneurial plaintiff's lawyers; foot-dragging defense counsel; and overwhelmed,
desperately improvising judges-have subordinated important public goals and the needs of
individual claimants to their own interests.
Schuck, supra note 316, at 942.
In contrast, Eric D. Green notes:
The objections of my academic colleagues are serious and well intentioned, but they unfortunately
reflect a cloistered, unduly conservative, and unrealistic view of mass torts and the federal
courts....

Applying classwide remedies--including the benefits of classwide settlements-to disputes
arising out of classwide mass harms inflicted by producers of mass products distributed in such a
way so as to affect millions of individuals, may be necessary to achieve fairness broadly, rather
than on a hit-or-miss basis. Otherwise, in the whole channel from manufacturing through
distribution, installation, exposure, impact, injury, and redress, the institutions responsible for
redress will be the only ones operating on a unit-by-unit basis.
Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When AdjudicationEnds? We'll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23
Into the Twenty-First Century,44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1788-98 (1997).
318. See FED. R. CIv. P. 42 (permitting consolidation of"actions involving a common question of
law or fact pending before the court"). There are two recent proposals to expand upon this principle of

Washington University Open Scholarship

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

(VOL. 76:781

joinder, "I multidistrict litigation, 320 and class actions32 1 -have enjoyed only
sporatic successes. Bankruptcy may provide the best means available under

current law for the consolidated handling of mass tort claims pending against
a debtor.32 2 Bankruptcy ensures that unsecured creditors, including tort

consolidation. The American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project would allow "intersystem
consolidation"-consolidation "involving transfer from state court to federal court, from federal court
to state court, or from one state to another." Erichson, supra note 234, at 947 n.14; see AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS WITH
REPORTER'S STUDY (1994); see also Linda Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation
Project Rests, 54 LA. L. REv. 977 (1994) ("[IThe Complex Litigation Project seems destined to
represent a massive, engaging intellectual exercise rather than a pragmatic blueprint that Congress will
enact for the conduct of complex litigation."); William W. Schwartzer, et al., JudicialFederalism in
Action: Coordinationof Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REv. 1689, 1699 (1992)
(Congress "is not likely to enact [the Complex Litigation Project proposals] in the foreseeable
future."). The Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act ("UTLA") would instead allow consolidation of
related cases pending in multiple state courts. UTLA has been adopted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, but has been enacted only in South Dakota. It is under
consideration in Kansas, Nebraska, Virginia and West Virginia. See Erichson, supra note 234, at 947
n.14; Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical
Advantages of the State Forum Over the FederalForum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 215,268 & n.287 (1994).
319. See FED. IL CIv. P. 19, 20 (providing for mandatory and permissive joinder); see also, e.g.,
Roger H. Trangsrud, JoinderAlternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 779 (1985)
(discussing the desirability and permissability of alternatives to joinder in mass tort cases).
320. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994) (permitting, for example, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation to consolidate pending federal lawsuits into a single judicial district for purposes of
discovery).
321. The FederalRules ofCivil Procedurepermits the filing of a class action if (1)the class is "so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable," (2) there are "questions of law or fact common
to the class," (3) "the [common] questions of law or fact... predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members," (4) "the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims of defenses of the class," (5) "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class," and (6) "a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. CIv. P. 23. Recent circuit court decisions "sharply
undercut the legal support for the class action as a vehicle for pathbreaking litigation." Nagareda, In
the Aftermath, supra note 299, at 302 (discussing this case law). Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997), affg, Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), questions the viability of settlement class actions. In Amchem
Products, the Court upheld the legitimate role of settlement as a factor in class action certification
decisions. But because it still required satisfaction of the "commonality" and "adequacy" elements of
the rule, many view the decision as sounding "the death knell for nationwide mass tort class action
(whether settled or litigated) under the current version of Rule 23." Green, supra note 317, at 1775.
And although "a current proposed amendment strives to make settlement clauses [sic] possible in
appropriate cases," id., "the proposed Rule 23 has encountered substantial opposition from segments
of the academic community." Nagareda, In the Aftermath, supra note 299, at 3 10.
322. Several commentators share this view. Barbara J. Houser described chapter 11 as an
"important tool to assist companies in bringing closure" to mass tort claims. Barbara J. Houser,
Chapter11 as a Mass Tort Solution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 451 (1998). Ralph R. Mabey and Peter
A. Zissner contended that "the bankruptcy court is the best forum for [resolution of mass tort] cases
since the Code allows one court to assert jurisdiction over all state and federal lawsuits aghinst a
manufacturer." Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zissner, Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The
Unfinished Business Left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.L 487, 488 (1995). John A.
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claimants, are paid in full before the shareholders of a corporate tortfeasor
recover on their equity;323 within constitutional limits, it requires that existing
324
tort claimants share equally with future claimants.
It also provides
325 and disclosure rights, 326
voting
a
such
protections,
important procedural
largely absent in nonbankruptcy methods of mass tort claim aggregation.
Bankruptcy may not provide a perfect forum for the resolution of mass
tort claims,327 but a construction of section 1334(c)(1) that encourages
widespread abstention from these personal injury and wrongful death mass
tort claims threatens to obviate bankruptcy as a means for aggregated
resolution of these claims. Abstention amounts to a procedural opt out from
the bankruptcy case, although outside of bankruptcy claimants cannot opt out
of "limited fund" class actions. 328 Abstention from mass tort claims delays
Siliciano stated:
Congress has already defined a comprehensive scheme for the mandatory reorganization of
liabilities. If this legislative device is functioning poorly, then legislative amendment is the
appropriate solution, not ad hoc common law substitutes. To the extent that mass tort litigation is
truly 'akin to public litigations,' that public law is to be found in the Bankruptcy Code.
John A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 990, 1005 (1995).
Additionally, John Coffee stated, "Both substantively and procedurally, bankruptcy reorganization has
comparative advantages over a mass tort class action as a means of achieving an equitable resolution
of mass tort liabilities that is fair to tort creditors." Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 317, at 1457-61.
Finally, Mark J. Roe contended that "when future claims are large in relation to firm value there
should be an early reorganization that resolves those claims" and proposed amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code to deal with "practical problems of management, uncertainties of claim valuation
and the impossibility of identifying future claimants [which] seem to pose significant obstacles to the
effective implementation of these principles in a reorganization in which future as well as present
claimants are fairly compensated." Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846,
848-49 (1984).
On the other hand, some commentators caution that bankruptcy is not meant to be a solution to the
mass tort problem. See, e.g., Nagareda, OutrageousFortune,supra note 299, at 1145-50 (condemning
resolution of mass torts in bankruptcy context "where the merits of the underlying tort claims are open
to doubf'); Green, supra note 317, at 1797 ("Experience in mass torts teaches that bankruptcy is not an
effective approach to these problems."); Nagareda, In the Aftermath, supra note 299, at 344 ("One
should hesitate, however, before regarding Chapter 11 as a panacea in this area.").
323. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1994) (absolute priority rule).
324. See id.
§ 1122 (classification of claims).
325. See id.
§ 1126 (acceptance of plan of reorganization).
326. See id. § 1125 (postpetition disclosure and solicitation).
327. See supra articles cited in note 322. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission recently
included, in its report to Congress, proposals to improve bankruptcy treatment of mass tort claims. See
National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Bankruptcy: THE NExT TWENTY YEARs 315-50 (1997),
available in National Bankruptcy Commission (last modified Nov. 26,
1997)
<http://www.nbre.gov/reporttitlepg.html>. For criticism of these proposals, see Edith H. Jones, Rough
Justice in Mass FutureClaims: Should Bankruptcy Courts Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1695
(1998).
328. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (providing that where prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are met, a
class action can be maintained if "prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of... adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter... impair or impede [other claimants'] ability to protect their interests");
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the administration of the debtor-defendant's bankruptcy case because
piecemeal adjudication of these claims generally takes longer than if handled

on a aggregated basis,3 particularly
where this individuated resolution would
29
occur in multiple fora.

V. CONCLUSION

This Article contends that federal courts should abstain from exercising

their bankruptcy jurisdiction in the same circumstances that they abstain from
their exercise of diversity or federal question jurisdiction, unless institutional
or qualitative differences in these grants of federal jurisdiction compel

application of distinct abstention doctrines. Moreover, it finds little basis for
distinguishing bankruptcy from nonbankruptcy abstention doctrines on these

grounds.
The limited authority of non-Article III bankruptcy courts to "hear and
determine" proceedings that are merely related to a title 11 bankruptcy case
does not create a constitutional mandate for broadly construing the scope of
the discretionary bankruptcy abstention provision. Questions regarding the
constitutionality of an exercise of jurisdiction by an untenured bankruptcy
judge pertain to the proper allocation ofjudicial authority between Article III
federal district courts and non-Article III bankruptcy courts, and not to the
breadth of bankruptcy jurisdiction exercised by either of these federal courts

see also, e.g., Flanagan v. Abeam (In re Asbestos Litig.), 90 F.3d 963, 982-86 (5th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that decision to certify limited fund class action did not circumvent Bankruptcy Code),
329. Despite disagreement on how best to accomplish this goal, there is broad consensus that
aggregated resolution of mass tort claims is preferred. See, e.g., Nagareda, Turning From Tort, supra
note 299, at 900 (proposing "to replace traditional tort litigation with a private administrative
framework"); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE INMASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995) (proposing broad
compensatory framework that would reduce mass tort victims' need to bring tort suits); David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort
System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984) (proposing egalitarian vision of "bureaucratic justice" under
which the class action would be rationalized by legal rules that standardize damages and adjudicate all
claims in one mandatory class action). Even John Coffee, the most vocal critic of the use of class
actions to resolve mass tort claims, concedes that claims aggregation has substantial benefits. He
describes the preference for class action format as "rational" because
(1) it economizes on transaction costs or permits greater financial or other resources to be
assembled to counteract the typically greater resources of the defendants, (2) it threatens risk
averse defendants with greater liability and so deters them from going to trial, and (3) it avoids a
'race to judgment' among competing plaintiffs who fear either the impact of precedents in other
related cases or that defendants' assets may be insufficient to fund the aggregate recoveries.
John C. Coffee, The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation:Balancing Fairnessand Efficiency in
the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 and 904 (1987). He criticizes "the dynamics of
class action litigation because they create high agency costs, asymmetric stakes, and cost
differentials." Id.
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over issues arising solely under state law.
Nor should abstention from state law proceedings related to a federal
bankruptcy case be viewed as a purely discretionary determination to decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Even if some bankruptcy jurisdiction is
best characterized as a form of supplemental jurisdiction, the significance of
this analogy as applied to the permissive bankruptcy abstention provision is
overpowered by principles of statutory interpretation. The plain language of
section 1334(c)(1) does not permit a construction which applies narrow
standards of abstention to proceedings that arise under the Bankruptcy Code,
but broad standards for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to
proceedings that arise in or relate to the federal bankruptcy case. Nor does
section 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute, including section 13 67(c),
broadly vesting district courts with the discretion to decline an exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction, purport to govern in bankruptcy.
Finally, a broad permissive bankruptcy abstention doctrine generally
contradicts the bankruptcy goal favoring expeditious administration and
resolution of bankruptcy cases because, more often than not, the
fragmentation of bankruptcy jurisdiction among federal and state courts
complicates and stalls the bankruptcy process. The bankruptcy goal of
expeditiousness justifies abstention when a delegation of jurisdiction is the
most efficient course of action, but these circumstances are exceptional;
generally, efficient bankruptcy administration is fostered by resolution of all
bankruptcy related litigation in a single bankruptcy forum.
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